

087078

JPRS-UMA-86-008

6 February 1986

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

19990211 075

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

13
78
A95

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

6 February 1986

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Importance of Innovation for Combat Readiness (Ye. Sizov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, Sep 85) ..	1
Lt Gen Goncharov on Improving Daily Life, Surroundings of Troops (N. Goncharov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, Sep 85)	9
Editorial Calls for Improvement in Work With Letters, Complaints (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, Sep 85)	18
Editor's Investigation of Letter Noted (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, Sep 85)	25
Wife Faults Party Organizations in Collapse of Officer's Career (N. Litvinov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, Sep 85).	27
Limits of Criticism, Self-Criticism (V. Lavrik; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Nov 85)	34
Glavpu Conference on Party Work With Families (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Nov 85)	35

ARMED FORCES

Interview With Col Gen V. M. Arkhipov (V. M. Arkhipov Interview; VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, 6 Nov 85) .	36
Obituary: Maj Gen Maslov I. N. Shkadov, et al.; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Nov 85)	39
Command, Control: Problems in Introducing Computers (Ye. Kolibernov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Nov 85)	40
Import of, Resistance to Computers in Tactical Decisionmaking (A. Pavlov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Nov 85)	44

Briefs	
Military Tribunals Meeting	45
GROUND FORCES	
Discussion of New BTR-80	
(A. Vasilyev, V. Sirenko; ZNAMENOSETS, No 11, Nov 85) ...	46
CIVIL DEFENSE	
Yeniseysk Auto Enterprise Draws Criticism From RSFSR CD	
(VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA, No 9, Sep 85)	50
Description of Rural Exercise	
(I. Podiyenkov; VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA, No 9, Sep 85)	51
REAR SERVICES/DEFENSE INDUSTRIES	
Review: Civil Air Fleet in WWII	
(A. Vitkovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Nov 85)	54
DOSAAF	
On Need To Improve Leadership Cadres	
(V. Sysoyev; VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA, No 9, Sep 85)	56
MILITARY HISTORY	
Review: Zhilin on War, Military History	
(Val. Goltsev; IZVESTIYA, 7 Dec 85)	62
AFGHANISTAN	
Narrative of Fighting on Qonduz-Mazar-e Sharif Route	
(A. Lazarev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Dec 85)	64
Pakistan Alleged To Prepare 'Genocide' of Border Tribes	
(TASS, 3 Dec 85)	67
TASS Reports 'Tense Situation' in Khyber Pass	
(TASS, 14 Dec 85)	69
TASS: Pakistan Using DRA Rebels To Suppress Pashtuns	
(TASS, 17 Dec 85)	70
PRAVDA Reports of 'Rebel Crimes'	
(V. Baykov; PRAVDA, 13 Dec 85)	71
Moscow TV: Rebels Bomb Kabul Polytechnical Institute	
(A. Petrova; Moscow Television Service, 18 Dec 85)	73
Briefs	
Paper on Afghan Military Doctors	74
PRAVDA Notes Surrender of Rebel Groups	74

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

IMPORTANCE OF INNOVATION FOR COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sept 85 (signed to press 4 Sept 85) pp 35-41

[Article by Maj Gen Avn Ye. Sizov, chief of the Political Section of the Main Staff and Directorates of the Commander in Chief of Air Defense Forces, under the "Combat Readiness and Military Indoctrination" rubric: "Staff Communists and a Feeling for Innovation"]

[Text] The changes in modern means of warfare and in methods of conducting it, and the ever increasing demands made of the combat readiness of air defense units and subunits in the current, tense military-political situation are having a significant effect upon the work of the staffs and their party organizations. Communists in the command echelons are expected to thoroughly grasp the new developments in military affairs and find the most effective ways to enhance combat readiness. They are required to persistently seek those leadership methods and procedures which will ensure successful fulfillment of the training plans and programs and the socialist commitments.

The ability to detect and support something new and help it take hold--this is what we regard today as one of the most important tasks of the staff and directorate Communists.

Given the contemporary intense pace of the administrative work, at a time when the number of tasks performed by the command echelons is constantly growing and the time available for accomplishing them is decreasing, a time when life and the contemporary level of development of military affairs are making it urgently necessary to seek fundamentally new forms and methods of accomplishing the combat training tasks, profound theoretical knowledge, great skill and irreproachable efficiency organically combined with creativity and innovation are demanded of the staff officer as never before. It was pointed out at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that mere efficiency is no longer enough, although there is sometimes not enough even of that. The importance of such performance qualities as competence, a feeling for innovation, initiative, boldness and a willingness to assume responsibility, and the ability to assign a task and see it through to the end are becoming increasingly important.

The officers-and-Communists in our Main Staff and directorates include many whose work style measures up to these great demands of the party. A feeling

for innovation is an organic part of all their multifaceted work. I shall cite an instructive example.

Officers-and-Communists V. Bochkov, V. Filippov and O. Pyl'nik are constantly at the command posts and take a personal part in the drills and exercises, and they carefully scrutinize and analyze the actions of crew commanders and specialists. Once, they noticed that the means of automation were not being fully utilized in combat command and control in one of the units. This was making it impossible to achieve the necessary quality and efficiency in the combat work. They thought about how the role of the ASU [automatic control systems] could be increased in the transmission, reception and display of the radar information. They thoroughly studied experience acquired in the outstanding military collectives and discussed it with other staff specialists. Some of them were skeptical about the idea and doubted that the innovators' search would produce perceptible results. The officers-and-Communists completed what they had started, however. And the creative approach to the work, embodied in an effective invention, is helping to enhance the combat readiness of units and subunits.

It is usually said about such Communists that "they have a well developed feeling for innovation." Such people are always at the forward edge in the battle to implant scientific and technical progress in military affairs. Ardent foes of routine and the mechanical use of obsolete procedures, they always defend the innovative approach to the job. This is totally in keeping with the party's contemporary demands for a restructuring of the work style and the attitude of the people. Today, on the eve of the party congress, the main slogan of the moment is the appeal to think and work innovatively, to activate all reserves making it possible to achieve a decisive acceleration and appreciable progress in the functioning of the labor and military collectives. This kind of restructuring is not a simple matter, but it is extremely necessary. To continue working in the old way, by inertia, means not troubling oneself to analyze the dialectics of life and military affairs, means being at a standstill. Soaring boldly in creative thought and a desire to resolutely break down the barriers of routine functioning, to find more effective methods of performing the work, not to stop with what has been achieved, to rapidly recognize the value of something new and see that it becomes rooted--this is what has always typified the communists.

It would perhaps be appropriate to ask ourselves at this point: Where does a feeling for innovation in the staff worker-and-Communist come from? How is it generated? Under what conditions does it become necessary to depart from the accustomed, from the obsolete? In my opinion, there are several crucial factors.

Innovation cannot be produced and become established if the individual who is striving for it is not thoroughly convinced of its social and political significance and cannot integrate it with the dialectics of reforms in military affairs and with his duty to foster the strengthening and enhancement of the homeland's defense capability. The Communist's profound ideological conviction and his ability to apply the methodological principles of Marxist-Leninist science in daily practical affairs and turn his knowledge into action

comprise the foundation of both innovative thinking and innovative performance. One's awareness of his great party responsibility for the assigned job and one's desire to put his soul into it hinge on this. The sense of responsibility in turn creates a hunger for quest, creativity, initiative and a desire to reach the necessary goal by a shorter route.

Quest and creativity, however, can only produce a concrete result when the officer-and-Communist takes a competent approach to the resolution of pressing problems, when he undertands the fine points of his job and can rapidly spot the seeds of something progressive. An efficient and creative style in the work of the staff party organization also contributes a great deal to the development of a feeling for innovation in the Communists. If it encourages and supports initiative in the Communists, actively combats everything old and obsolete and fosters the enhancement of the staff officers' professional skill, the quest for innovation becomes established more rapidly in such a climate, the people begin looking more keenly at all of the fine points of the tasks being performed and search more boldly for unutilized reserves, effective procedures and methods for the combat work, the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

The work of the party organization headed by Lieutenant Colonel N. Shapochkin deserves attention in this respect. The complexity of the tasks performed by the communists in that collective makes great demands of their level of professional military training. The party organization develops in the Communists a sense of not being satisfied with what has been achieved, a need to be creative and a desire to innovate in the performance of their tasks. Party meetings and bureau sessions define ways to increase the Communists' sense of responsibility for the state of combat readiness and for the mastery of the new equipment. Useful initiatives are actively supported there.

At one of the party meetings, for example, the Communists proposed preparing a simulator of an antiaircraft missile system for use in the classroom. The idea did not simply come up all of a sudden. When they were out in the forces, the staff officers made a careful study of how the mastery of the system was proceeding and of innovations in this area in the work of the best commanders. The latter also expressed the idea that it would be a good thing to build a training device which would reduce the amount of time required to master the equipment and make the process more economical. The proposal received support. A resolution was passed on the proposal at a party meeting. The project was begun without delay. The plan was implemented. The large-scale manufacture of the simulator is now being discussed. This would contribute to improved mastery of the system and the conservation of equipment life, and ultimately, to the most important thing--the enhancement of combat readiness.

As the party bureau mobilizes the Communists to seek new reserves, means and methods of mastering the complex equipment and weapons, it gives a great deal of attention to enhancing their technical knowledge and their skills in the operation and the combat employment of the new generation of weapons. The party activists have helped the command element prepare and conduct assemblies at which supervisory personnel studied the most progressive methods of mastering the modern equipment. In order to improve the theoretical knowledge and

the practical skills of the specialists, a scientific and practical conference was held on the subject "The Modern Equipment: A Higher Level of Mastery," and seminars were conducted on the adoption of new elements in the training facilities themselves and in the work methods of the instructors.

Group consultations conducted at the initiative of the party bureau are helping to improve the operational-tactical and the technical military preparation of the officers-and-Communists. Newly arrived officers are provided with systematic assistance. At the party organization's assignment, the best trained specialists work with them on an individual basis and share their know-how with them. All of this helps to develop a high level of professionalism in the officers and equips them with progressive methods. When they go out into the forces, they bring the most modern knowledge and skills and interest the people in taking a new approach to the job.

The Political Section of the Main Staff and Directorates strives to see that the work style of our Communists is creative and that it eliminates superficiality and formalism. The officer who skims over the surface, so to speak, cannot spot the most efficient innovations in the standing of alert duty or the training and indoctrination of the personnel. We strive to see that every party organization develops in the Communists in charge the ability to competently analyze the work style of the specialists and instructors and detect all of the most progressive things developing in the praxis, and to help them disseminate it. We teach this to the secretaries and members of the party committees and bureaus in seminars and on the job.

A serious and purposeful approach to the development of a feeling for innovation in the staff Communists is typical of the work of the party bureau in which Colonel V. Pishchulin is secretary, for example. The people there have correctly determined that they cannot expect innovative suggestions for increasing the range of forms and methods for directing the work and mastering the equipment and methods of employing it, unless they improve their skills and their theoretical and methodological level and detect new trends in military affairs. The party bureau proposed that classes on methods be regularly conducted for the officers. The command element supported the initiative. Today, before the staff officers are sent TDY into the forces, they thoroughly study the requirements contained in guiding documents and instructions and are familiarized with experience in accomplishing the task on which they will be working in the units and informed of the state of affairs in the collectives which they are preparing to visit. The important thing is that these classes discuss where the staff officers need to focus their main efforts in the search for new reserves for improving the combat work and what matters must be approached in a new way.

The bureau regularly hears accounts and reports from the Communists on their fulfillment of their service and party duties. It also inquires about what innovations they have noticed in the forces and what kinds of proposals and recommendations they have for promoting progress in administration and in the combat training work. When CPSU members A. Mikhaylov and V. Malyshev were presenting reports at one of the meetings, for example, the discussion turned

to what adjustments, in the opinion of those comrades, needed to be made in the process of mastering the new equipment and organizing the combat training in order to better accomplish the tasks facing the units. Both of the officers were ready for this turn in the discussion.

They knew that it had become the rule to inquire also about this important aspect of the work of the staff Communists in the forces when accounts are rendered in the bureau. They therefore expressed their ideas in detail and with a thorough knowledge of matters. These included many which required practical organizational steps on the part of the command element, the political organ and the staff specialists. The bureau secretary informed the appropriate officials. Adjustments were made in the methods used for providing the personnel with a mastery of the new equipment and for organizing the combat training. The final result of the innovative proposals and practical efforts of officers Mikhaylov and Malyshev can be seen today in the fact that the periods of time required to master the complex weapons has been reduced and the training process has been organized more efficiently.

It is a complicated matter for a staff officer to be able to spot innovation in the units and permit it to develop or himself to be the "generator" of innovation. It is not enough simply to have the desire. Competence, vast knowledge and the ability to think deeply and analytically and seek the shortest path to the accomplishment of the tasks involved are also essential. Unfortunately, not everyone has this ability. Let me cite the following case.

Communists in the staff party organization in which officer A. Polyakov is secretary repeatedly worked in subunits of one of the units. Among other things, they worked to improve the care of the weapons. Many things were still being done in the old way and not at the proper level in the military collective. Those whose service duties require that they put everything into place were unable to detect this main factor, however. They had a blunted feeling for innovation. As a result, in a unit inspection those subunits were given a lower rating for care of the equipment....

A feeling for innovation does not come to the individual all by itself. It is developed and cultivated. Some officers would be glad to introduce something new into the work, to propose an original method for accomplishing a certain task, but they do not know where precisely to apply their efforts and frequently focus on something secondary instead of what is important. The best thing to do in this case is "to put into play" the experience of those who have long had a highly and solidly developed feeling for innovation, those from whom a great deal can be learned. Colonel N. Mulik, an officer-and-Communist in one of our directorates, is such an individual. He is constantly seeking more effective means and methods for accomplishing the combat work. He has a thorough knowledge of his functional duties and the ASU equipment and has introduced many methodological innovations making it possible to markedly improve the alert duty and reduce the amount of time required to achieve a high level of coordination among the specialists on the crews. He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star and the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," Third Degree, for his successes in mastering the new equipment.

The party committee paid close attention to innovations in the work of one of the best staff specialists. At the party organ's assignment CPSU members and officers Ye. Leventsov, V. Kanakov and P. Grishkin studied Mulik's experience and methods for developing his innovations, familiarized the other staff officers with them and arranged for a demonstration class. During the class Mulik demonstrated his methods of working with the equipment. Many people followed his example. What is more, there are now officer-and-Communists on the staff who have succeeded in further developing the experience of their colleague and gone further in their innovative quest. All of this has produced a perceptible benefit with respect to improving the alert duty, training and indoctrinating the young specialists.

A staff officer-and-Communist who thinks and has great concern for his work will rapidly appreciate the value of an innovation which will help to improve the situation in the area entrusted to him and will "grab onto" that innovation with both hands, so to speak. The ability to take advantage of the know-how of those out front, the most efficient methods of performing the job, organizing the administrative aspect, and so forth--this is also a feeling for innovation. But how frequently certain officers-and-communists still stand at the life-giving source and continue to be thirsty because they do not see the nearby healing waters. This is borne out by the following.

The directorate party organization in which Ye. Dorogov is secretary of the bureau gives a great deal of attention to publicizing progressive know-how. This includes, among other things, many new and most importantly, more effective, methods of performing the firing practice, exercises, classes and drills and training the leading specialists. A study made by officers on the Main Staff has shown that party organizations with similar tasks have not attached any significance to these nuggets of progressive know-how. The innovations, which are beneficial to combat readiness, are still going unnoticed. This is an inexcusable position for Communists, whose duty it is to firmly establish progressive things and not sweep them aside. Specifically, this criticism should be addressed to the party organizations whose rosters include CPSU members P. Starenkiy and I. Beshentsev. When innovation knocks at the door, it should be opened.

Today, our party regards the acceleration of scientific and technical progress as a matter of paramount importance in all of the work. And this task pertains directly to all areas of military affairs. It is therefore important for the party organizations of staffs and directorates to promptly find swift and effective methods of resolving this problem. We have party collectives which are establishing precisely this approach in their work.

The party organizations headed by Colonels N. Goncharov and Yu. Zaytsev, for example, the acceleration of scientific and technical progress and the Communists' tasks with respect to ensuring the effectiveness and quality of the research performed in the interest of improving the equipment and weapons were thoroughly and extensively discussed at meetings and sessions of the party bureau. The decisions adopted are being turned into concrete actions.

Communists Yu. Yovlev, V. Maslov, N. Turko and others are making an important personal contribution to the development of creative technical work. The party activists have expanded their working links with the party organizations of academies and with military scientists for purposes of increasing the results of the research and its application. It has become the practice to hold joint consultations and discussions of practical questions.

The Air Defense Forces have numerous examples of productive cooperation between staff party organizations and scientific institutions in the development and modernization of equipment, the elaboration of operational and tactical questions pertaining to its use, and the improvement of operating methods. For example, coordinated efforts have provided for the development, the production and testing of promising means of control within relatively short periods of time.

The Political Section constantly works to enhance party influence upon the development of rationalization and invention work helping to increase the effectiveness of the combat equipment and weapons and to reduce the time required to make them combat-ready. Colonels V. Kolesnik and A. Matov and Majors A. Semashko and V. Gorshkov, Communists, have made an important contribution. Each of them has more than 50 invention certificates. These officers-and-Communists perform a great deal of work to develop young innovators.

Scientists at the Military Engineering Academy of Air Defense Forces imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov have developed a large number of devices for enhancing the effectiveness of the radio-electronic equipment. Almost all of the projects have been realized.

Innovation is born and becomes established in the battle against the old. Unfortunately, the bearers of stagnation and formalism are often stronger than innovative initiative. In one of the units, for example, engineering and technical personnel led by officer V. Nikolskiy developed and mastered a new and progressive system for the technical servicing of computer equipment. After thoroughly analyzing the innovation and summarizing the results, the Main Staff supported it. Not all of the officials properly appreciated the innovation, however. It was only due to the persistence of Comrades I. Kislyakov and V. Pishchulin, Communists at the Main Staff, that the new technical servicing system was universally adopted and received recognition in all units of the branch of troops. The effect was immediate: The reliability indices for the weapons rose 2- to 5-fold, and the amount of time required to service the equipment was reduced 1.5-fold, without lowering the quality.

I frequently ask myself: Why does innovation frequently have a difficult time gaining acceptance? I arrive at the conclusion that the habit of traveling the beaten path has developed in the work style of certain staff Communists. It is more reliable, they reason, there are fewer difficulties, and one does not have to think as much. There is no mental searching with this attitude, of course, no desire "to cover virgin territory," and the individual brushes aside all new ideas and suggestions: "It is not according to instructions"! That is the crux of the matter. Fear to experiment frequently ruins a promising undertaking.

In order for a staff Communist to have a well developed feeling for innovation, he must have a thorough knowledge of the life of the troops, always be informed on affairs in the units and subunits, know how operational, tactical, special and technical questions are resolved, and clearly see beneficial things which develop in the praxis. We frequently encounter cases, however, in which certain staff officers do not visit the troops for long periods of time, lag behind life and lose their sense of perspective. This was the situation at one time in the party organization in which officer V. Dovgulya is secretary. In addition, certain of the Communists demonstrated a poor knowledge of the new equipment and did not have an adequate knowledge of the methods for mastering it. How could there be a feeling for innovation in this situation? Conclusions were drawn and steps were taken in good time, and the situation changed.

A study of the state of affairs in the party organizations has shown that some of them exert little influence with respect to accomplishing long-range tasks involved in the development of the forces and their technical equipment. We still have party organizations which delay mobilizing the Communists for the practical implementation of new requirements set for the combat readiness both in the work of directorates, sections and services and in subordinate units and subunits. There has not yet been a turn toward innovation in their work style. There are new requirements with respect to tactics, and the equipment is new, but the party work methods are sometimes old ones. There is sufficient discussion of this at party meetings and bureau sessions. There is little practical action, however. For several years, the need to restructure, to approach pressing problems of administrative work in a new way and find additional reserves for improving it, for example, has been discussed at meetings of the party collective in which Comrade A. Senchenkov is secretary. Unfortunately, however, it all still just a matter of good intentions. The Political Section has taken the necessary indoctrinational and organizational steps to bring the work of that party organization into conformity with the contemporary requirements.

The Political Section can see failures of its own in deficiencies in the work of a number of our party organizations with respect to developing a feeling for innovation, efficiency and responsibility in the Communists, of course. As we implement the requirements set forth at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, we are focusing our efforts on providing the lower party organizations with daily and specific assistance, eliminating adherence to the armchair work style, stepping up our verification of performance and increasing the practical return.

The staff Communists have large and important tasks on the eve of the 27th CPSU Congress. The Political Section, the party committees and party bureaus are striving persistently to see that all of them actively influence the state of affairs in the units and subunits, ensure quality performance of the tasks involved in enhancing combat readiness, actively promote the progressive and most effective means and methods of training the personnel, and set an example with their innovative approach in the fulfillment of their party and service duty.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1985.

11499

CSO: 1801/58

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LT GEN GONCHAROV ON IMPROVING DAILY LIFE, SURROUNDINGS OF TROOPS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sept 85 (signed to press 4 Sept 85) pp 17-23

[Article by Lt Gen N. Goncharov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District:
"Good Daily Life Organizes and Disciplines"]

[Text] Visits to the fightingmen by their parents have now become a good tradition. They want to know about the life and service of their sons. Naturally, they pay particular attention to living arrangements for the soldiers, to whether they are well fed and how they spend their free time. One can understand the parents: even grownup children are still children to them. Private I. Kolyuzhnyy's mother came to see him. She was warmly received in the regiment. She was acquainted with the traditions, the life and general living conditions of the personnel. She was invited to dine in the enlisted men's mess hall. She liked the way the mess hall looked inside, and she liked the meal itself. The soldier's mother also went into the barracks. The neatly made, clean beds, the tulle curtains on the windows and the flowers pleased her eyes. And the guest was quite amazed at the corner for living things with its aquarium and birds.

"Just like home: pretty and comfortable. Our sons are well fed, provided with good clothing and footwear, and one could not wish for better conditions for their rest and relaxation," the soldier's mother said. "One could serve here forever." And she heartily thanked the commanders and political workers for their paternal concern for the fightingmen.

And fightingmen of the regiment in which Major N. Anokhin is deputy commander for political affairs do serve conscientiously. They work persistently to master the science of the military, successfully accomplish all of the combat training tasks and socialist commitments to provide a fitting reception for the 27th CPSU Congress and are distinguished by good discipline. This is a result of the extensive and productive ideological-political and organizational work performed by the commanders, political workers and party collectives. Residential and service buildings, the water supply and heating systems, the parade ground and the recreational area on the military post are kept in exemplary order. There is a lot of greenery on the unit's territory, and there is good visual agitation. The regiment concerns itself with improving housing

conditions for the officers and warrant officers and members of their families, organizing recreation for them, providing medical services and supplying them with food and manufactured goods.

Why am I discussing general living conditions on the military post in detail? It is because these things, which might on the surface appear ordinary, clearly show the well thought-out work style of the commander, his deputy for political affairs, the party and Komsomol aktiv and those who manage the facility. Questions pertaining to enhancing combat readiness and strengthening regulation are to them inseparable from concern for the daily life and recreation of the personnel. And this is only natural. We know that there is a moral climate conducive to the indoctrination of the people and that personnel serve diligently and perform their military duty conscientiously wherever real concern is shown for the individual, for his needs, requests and requirements.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government demonstrate constant concern for the homeland's armed defenders, for satisfying their material and cultural needs and requests. Constant improvement of the daily life and surroundings of the troops, of living conditions for the people, is a matter of great importance.

Today, on the eve of the 27th CPSU Congress, the district communists are carefully analyzing the results of their work, giving heightened attention to the quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrinational process, and assessing from the high party position its contribution to the enhancement of the combat readiness of the units and formations and the strengthening of discipline. With respect to the extensive work we have undertaken in the district to improve all of the work of the cadres in light of instructions issued at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, we are reviewing everything being done by the commanders, political workers and party organizations to improve the daily life of servicemen and their families.

The military posts are becoming more attractive and better equipped with services and utilities by the year. Many modern enlisted men's quarters, mess halls, snack bars, apartment buildings, clubs, personal service combines, medical centers and other cultural and personal service, public and service facilities have been built there. Active preparations are underway in the units for the All-Army Conference on Improving Living Conditions for the Troops, during which the movement with the slogan "For Every Garrison--Exemplary Living Conditions" will be expanded. Changes for the better are to be seen literally everywhere.

I have visited more than once the motorized rifle regiment in which Major S. Chichin is secretary of the party committee. The people there understand very well that there is a direct interdependence between living conditions and combat readiness and the state of discipline. This is frequently the subject of concerned discussion at party meetings and service conferences. The commander, the political worker and rear service officers are very careful when it comes to distributing funds allocated for improving facilities for the personnel and make full and thrifty use of internal reserves and possibilities for creating good living conditions for the servicemen.

I would mention the fact that the officials are constantly attentive to the requests of the families of officers and warrant officers. I have a reason for focusing attention on this. It sometimes happens that those in charge limit their concern for living conditions to the outfitting of the military post, but the chiefs do not always show an interest in the situation in the families of officers and warrant officers or in their living conditions. These are independent people, they reason, and capable of looking after themselves.

They are capable of doing so, of course, but it does not always have the very best affect on the mood of the people, on their mental state, when they are convinced that no one is really interested in their living conditions: Just do well in the service, and live your own life.

The situation is different at the garrison we are discussing. One senses order at the front gate, so to speak. Living quarters and service facilities are kept in exemplary order, and excellent athletic fields and an excellent parade ground have been built there. The enlisted men's mess hall, which was the object of criticism a few years ago for its poor equipment and appearance, is now one of the best in the district. Tables for six, attractive dishes, decorative displays, pictures and flowers--all of this puts the people into a good mood. The company-level administration and services are excellent in the regiment. Each subunit has a personal service room equipped to meet modern demands. They are fully provided with appliances, tools, expendables and so forth.

Officers and warrant officers and their families have good living conditions in the unit. Those in charge in the regiment find the opportunity to visit the home of this or that subordinate, to talk with his family members, to inquire about any difficulties experienced by the people and what kind of help they need. They are also interested in the condition of the housing, the post grounds and the functioning of the various services upon which the supply of manufactured goods and food for the people and their health depend. All of this increases the sense of responsibility of those in charge and produces satisfaction in the residents. And then the leaders themselves are constantly up to date on everything; they know the situation and can take prompt steps to correct any deficiencies.

The party committee is something like the accumulative center for the work of improving conditions for the personnel and improving general living conditions in the regiment. It constantly studies public opinion and takes it into account, responds severely to any shortcomings and holds the communists strictly accountable for deficiencies in living conditions for the servicemen and their families. Rear service officers and Communists A. Ziborev and S. Murygin presented reports at a meeting of the party committee this year, for example. While noting the initiative demonstrated by the CPSU members in the work, the party committee at the same time advised them to devote greater attention to the officers dormitory and to creating good conditions for organizing their rest and recreation there.

The military council recently used the regiment for conducting an assembly of directing personnel of the district units. The visitors were shown the barracks, the parks, the mess hall and the entire group of personal service buildings. The unit commanders, chiefs of political organs and rear service workers saw that it is possible to have a good military post, to organize personal services and the life of the fightingmen strictly in accordance with regulations and to maintain and preserve the equipment in an exemplary manner without the allocation of additional funds, by making prudent use of available materials and manpower and with purposeful work on the part of all the personnel.

Striking changes are clearly apparent today not just in the appearance of the enlisted men's barracks. Significant advances have also been made in the development of the materials and equipment base for the food service. Several new mess halls have been built in recent years in the district, and many have been remodeled. Auxiliary farms are playing an increasingly perceptible role with respect to improving the messing of the fightingmen. Demonstrating creativity and initiative, the outstanding collectives produce more than 15 kilograms of meat per person over and above the ration each year. Many units themselves meet the annual needs of the personnel for milk, eggs and other products.

The separate airfield technical maintenance battalion in which officers A. Martynenko and M. Ostapets serve is a graphic example of socialist enterprise and a thoughtful, truly creative approach to management. Around 6 tons of various vegetables were harvested and a large quantity of meat and milk was produced on the auxiliary farm there last year. And the total income in monetary terms is in 5 figures. The auxiliary farm has become a sort of conveyor belt carrying a constant supply of quality products to the table. The profitability of this farm is attested to also by the following fact. Last year alone income from the sale of meat and milk was practically triple the cost of maintaining the livestock. The hothouse facility is equally profitable.

The money obtained is spent carefully. Part of it is spent to obtain extra food for the enlisted men, while the remainder is used to improve housing and general living conditions. An 18-unit apartment building has been built in the unit with its own funds, the access roads to the motor vehicle pool have been asphalted, and 2,500 trees have been planted on the post.

The significance of the good surroundings, the improved housing, general living conditions and messing of the personnel goes far beyond just the economic benefits. No less important is the indoctrinational effect: the influence of the very structure of army life, including regulation daily life, upon the fightingmen. It would be difficult to overstate the role of skillful management and a good daily life with respect to further strengthening combat readiness and discipline and uniting the military collectives.

In the first place, the serviceman is not distracted from his main purpose, his combat training and service, by annoyances of daily life. He is not irritated by the infamous "trifles" which frequently ruin moods and have a negative effect upon performance. The soldier knows that when he returns from field

exercises, he will be able to dry out his footwear and uniform, that he can rest up in a warm and cheerful barracks and that an adequate, tasty meal awaits him. The officer does not have to worry about whether the roof is leaking at his home or whether he has water there, or about the fact that his wife cannot take a job because their child cannot be placed into a nursery. And as soon as these concerns are eliminated, there is nothing to prevent one from devoting himself entirely to his service duties.

There is another, no less important aspect of the matter. Paternal concern on the part of commanders and chiefs for the needs of their subordinates gives the fightingmen a sense of responsibility and gratitude, a desire to respond with good work, with even more zealous and diligent fulfillment of their service duty. The individual's conscience will not permit him to let down the caring commander or his collective.

The movement with the slogan "For Every Garrison--Exemplary Living Conditions" is expanding and gaining strength in our district forces. Competitions for the garrison with the best living conditions and facilities are held each year. Not just the military units, but educational institutions, medical establishments, trade and personal service enterprises take part in the competitions.

The Political Directorate attaches great importance to the work performed by political organs and party organizations to develop in the communists in charge a sense of responsibility for organizing the daily life of the personnel. This matter has been brought up for discussion more than once at meetings of the party and management aktiv of the formations, units and logistics establishments. Major General A. Levchenko, chief of the political section of the district staff and directorates; Colonel S. Komozin, chief of the rear service political section; and Colonel V. Sumarokov, chief of a formation political section, have presented reports in the political directorate.

The discussion of these matters has shown that certain political organs do not have a good knowledge of the situation in the units and subunits, have not achieved unity of words and deeds, of organizational and political work with respect to improving the daily life of the servicemen and do not apply demandingness based on principle to communists who neglect the day-to-day care of subordinates. Steps have been taken to more fully provide the personnel with all authorized allowances. People's control agencies took an active part in this. They have begun giving greater attention to the provision of personal services for the fightingmen. The political organs have begun monitoring the work of various components of the military trade system more thoroughly. Former military trade workers S. Budko, P. Polyanskiy, K. Franchuk and certain others have been brought to party accountability and relieved of their duties for deficiencies in the organization of trade services for the personnel, for the families of servicemen and for blue- and white-collar workers of the Soviet Army. We discussed problems having to do with meeting the personal daily needs of servicemen, blue- and white-collar workers recently in the district Military Council. It was pointed out that along with our achievements, we still have numerous deficiencies and unutilized reserves. Conditions for daily life leave something to be desired in certain units and subunits. Not everywhere does one sense that there is real party concern for

having the barracks in a pleasing state of cleanliness and strict order. One finds poorly equipped personal service rooms, there are sometimes not enough dishes in the mess hall, and the food is not tastily prepared. The military posts and the housing and personal service buildings are unsightly in some units and garrisons. All of this is due not to some sort of objective factors, but simply to inefficiency on the part of those in charge, to their disinclination to look into the so-called "trifles" of life. Certain officials substitute general statements about the need to improve general conditions for the servicemen for painstaking work to put the situation in order.

Such deficiencies existed in the work of officer A. Sumishevskiy. He substituted empty promises and statements about a lack of funds for real concern for the daily life of subordinates. In the Military Council we brought to strict and principled account those guilty of negligence toward the job and reminded them that in addition to material damage, mismanagement always results in moral and indoctrinational losses and provides a good environment for various types of negative occurrences. Unsatisfactory general living conditions ruins the mood of people and has a negative influence upon the organization of the training process and upon the state of combat readiness and military discipline. The garrison's command element derived the proper conclusions from the criticism and began a serious effort to correct the shortcomings.

Following the directions issued at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee with respect to enhancing organization and discipline, the district Military Council and Political Directorate, the political organs and party organizations are being more demanding of the communists in charge for the state of affairs in subordinate units and subunits and for not being attentive to the people. Officers M. Zhivotyagin, V. Shakhno, A. Nazaruk and certain others were brought to party accountability for serious shortcomings in the organization of general living conditions for the fightingmen, for example. Through their fault some of the servicemen were not receiving their authorized allowances at the right time, there were deficiencies in the operation of messing facilities, and the food was not always prepared well.

We had to review the junior specialists in the rear service component and organize systematic training for them. A district seminar was conducted for the subunit sergeants major. The deficiencies previously detected were eliminated as a result of the steps taken. The political organs continue to monitor these important sections, however.

We know that the fightingmen spend a considerable part of their time at the training centers, in the field and at the firing range, at the airfields and training grounds. This means that a considerable effort should be focused on improving the daily life of the personnel precisely there. It is particularly important to give attention to organizing the messing, bathing and laundry services, and the provision of prompt medical aid. The field clubs and Lenin rooms should be run in an excellent manner where the fightingmen are acquiring their combat skill, and arrangements should be made for letters, newspapers and magazines to arrive there without disruptions.

Unfortunately, certain commanders, political workers and rear service officers do not attach proper importance to organizing daily life for the personnel in the field, believing that they do not need conveniences there, that they can suffer it out. I can cite the following recent example.

Lieutenant Colonel P. Lega's tank battalion performed below its capabilities in a recent tactical exercise. When they began analyzing what had caused this, they revealed numerous oversights in organizing the field exercise. Most important was the fact that no concern was shown for the men who would be in those difficult circumstances. For example, they forgot to allocate the additional food authorized for the personnel in such cases. There were deficiencies in the outfitting and the provision of material and technical support for the fightingmen. Naturally, these oversights had a negative effect on the moral of the men and on the end result of their work.

We try to assess such occurrences from a standpoint of principle, in the party manner, and hold the specific officials strictly accountable for callousness and insensitivity toward their subordinates. It would be difficult to find a commander or chief who does not concern himself with his men today, of course. There are different kinds of concern, however. The documents show that a certain officer is doing a lot to maintain the daily life of the personnel at the proper level and to maintain a wholesome moral climate in the collective. Things do not work out, however, and breakdowns occur. What is the cause? Most frequently, it is the fact that this concern does not come from the leader's heart, figuratively speaking, and he does not have that rapport with the men without which one cannot detect bottlenecks or learn in good time who needs what kind of help.

Such deficiencies and cases of complacency ordinarily occur where the party organizations and people's controllers lose sight of questions having to do with providing the servicemen with everything they have coming to them. Take the chiefs of depots and enlisted men's mess halls, for example. Unfortunately, these workers are not always under proper party influence or exacting control. Certain party committees and bureaus sometimes take a liberal approach to those who violate the regulations, particularly when it comes to the handling of materiel; they do not like "to air their dirty linen in public."

As we combat this kind of connivance, we try to eliminate the concept, which still exists in some places, that service duties can be divided into "purely" management and "purely" indoctrinational duties. It is perfectly incorrect to view the matter as one of first creating the physical, general living conditions for the personnel and then setting about the indoctrination of the fightingmen. This process is merged into one and is closely interrelated. There is no issue pertaining to the daily life of people, which does not have indoctrinational significance.

At the same time, the organization of good general living conditions calls for purposeful party-political work. We strive to see that the political organs and party organizations constantly keep these matters in the focus of attention, bring them up for discussion in the bureaus and party committees and at

party meetings, carefully analyze the state of affairs at the sites and are highly demanding of those in charge, particularly the communists responsible for organizing the general living conditions.

We must admit that certain party collectives did not immediately turn themselves, so to speak, toward matters of daily life. At one time the party committee in which Major L. Borovskiy is secretary kept apart from these matters. The secretary of the party committee presented a report to the formation political section, which sternly pointed out the shortcomings and provided practical assistance. Matters began to improve, and the responsibility of the communists for providing good general living conditions for the people increased.

Today, it is not easy to imagine life at any garrison without stores containing a broad assortment of goods, without the welcoming, wide-open doors of officers mess halls, snack bars, enlisted men's tea-rooms and other military trade enterprises. The demand for them is constantly growing, however. For example, we face the task of turning the enlisted men's tea-rooms into true centers of culture and aesthetic development of the personnel, into a means of balanced development and spiritual enrichment of the fightingmen. A great deal has already been done in this area in the district forces. The Political Directorate has worked out the necessary recommendations and sent them to the forces, and is providing assistance with their implementation. Particular attention is being given to stimulating the work of the public councils of enlisted men's tea-rooms, to the inclusion of tasks involved in the political, military, moral and aesthetic development of the army youth in their plans, and to the holding of thematic evenings, meetings with war and labor veterans, chess and checker tournaments and evenings of poetry, music and paintings there. We are working to improve the physical plant of the enlisted men's tea-rooms and to provide them with necessary political education accessories and with material for decorating the interiors. A competition for best enlisted men's tea-room has been announced in the district forces.

The Lvov District Officers Club, the garrison officers clubs directed by Lieutenant Colonel B. Stuchevskiy and Major A. Pabyat, the unit club directed by Lieutenant P. Taradin and other cultural and educational establishments in the district are making an important contribution to the improvement of daily life and cultural leisure-time opportunities for the personnel. Their role in meeting the spiritual needs of the personnel has grown particularly since the CPSU Central Committee passed the decree "On Steps to Improve the Use of Clubs and Sports Facilities." Questions having to do with providing for the daily life and organizing recreation for the personnel receive constant attention in the district newspaper SLAVA RODINY. The articles it carries on these matters, both those publicizing good experience and the critical articles, are having a perceptible effect upon the situation in the units and subunits.

Commanders, political workers and rear service officers presently have an especially large number of concerns pertaining to preparations for winter. Most of the units began these preparations in good time, according to a well conceived plan. The amount of repair work needed on the housing and barracks, power and water supply facilities and engineer systems was determined, and repair brigades were set up back in the spring in the regiment in which Major

S. Chichin is secretary of the party committee. They are working without haste, but they are overlooking nothing and are preparing the regiment for winter according to plan.

I would like to stress once again in conclusion the fact that the provision of facilities for the daily life of the troops will not tolerate spiritual callousness or cold indifference. We need to show constant concern for the people, engage in judicious enterprise and quest, and have the desire and the ability to listen with sensitivity to the urgent requests of the servicemen. Constant concern for the daily life of the fightingmen is concern for their successes in the training and the service and for strengthening military discipline. In the final analysis, a good daily life means a high level of combat readiness.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1985.

11499

CSO: 1801/58

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN WORK WITH LETTERS, COMPLAINTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sept 85 (Signed to press 4 Sept 85) pp 3-8

[Editorial: "Attention to a Letter is Attention to a Person"]

[Text] Each day the staffs, political organs, party organizations and editors of military newspapers and magazines receive letters from servicemen, blue- and white-collar workers of the Soviet Army and Navy and members of their families. The people express their sincere gratitude to the party and the government for their constant concern with increasing our nation's economic and defensive strength and improving their welfare. They express unanimous support for the determined steps taken to further instill order and purify our society of things alien to the socialist way of life. They submit suggestions for strengthening the combat readiness of the units and subunits, raising the quality of the combat and political training, improving military living conditions and resolving other issues pertaining to army and navy life. The letters vary, but behind each of them is an individual with his thoughts, his cares and anxieties.

V.I. Lenin referred to letters from the workers as vital human documents. He handled every suggestion, every complaint and request with attention and sensitivity. Vladimir Ilich regarded the letters written to him and to party and soviet organs and newspaper editors as a rich source of information on the feelings of the people and on the state of affairs in the labor and military collectives.

The Lenin tradition of carefully considering letters is constantly being developed and enriched. The CPSU and the Soviet Government work tirelessly to see that those in charge lend a sensitive ear to the opinion of the Soviet people and attempt to take it into account as fully as possible and promptly take the steps necessary for carrying out the suggestions and handling complaints and requests.

The Communist Party constantly stresses the need to give unweakening attention to public opinion and show constant concern for the needs of the citizens. "We must be extremely attentive to everything pertaining to the individual, to his work and his rest," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated in his report at the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. "This is a key matter of policy for us."

Certain questions having to do with improving the praxis of reviewing letters from the workers in the party organs were discussed in July of this year at the regular session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. It was suggested that leading party organs take additional steps to improve publicity in the work of party, state and management organs and to improve the situation with respect to receiving citizens and considering their requests and complaints, giving special attention to the situation in those collectives from which the greatest number of critical statements emanates. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee underscored the fact that party committees and primary party organizations should thoroughly support party members and non-party comrades who uncover shortcomings from a standpoint of principle and strive to see that the communists set an example of candid, comradely criticism and self-criticism. Furthermore, as we enhance the effectiveness of the criticism, we should more boldly expose gossips and slanderers and bring them to strict accountability. Such calumnies are incompatible with communist moral principles, and they must have no place in our life.

Fulfilling the requirements of the Communist Party and instructions from the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the military councils, commanders, political organs and party organizations have begun giving greater attention to the handling of letters. The practices employed are regularly reviewed at meetings of the military councils, in the political organs, at assemblies and conferences of directing command and political personnel and in the party organizations. The people's control committees and groups have begun providing the commanders and political workers with more active assistance in this matter.

Many units of the Belorussian Military District, for example, have acquired good experience in reviewing letters and requests and organizing the reception of visitors. As a rule, suggestions, requests and complaints are reviewed and the decisions are made within the established periods of time. They are carefully studied and are taken into account in the daily work of commanders, political workers and the chiefs of directorates and the various services.

Sensitivity toward the people, a profound interest in resolving the problems troubling them and a desire truly to help them are typical features of the style of all of this important work. Not long ago, for example, the district political directorate received a report that there were deficiencies in Officer A. Panasenko's work with subordinates, that he was treating them with arrogance and lack of demandingness. Workers with the political directorate promptly and thoroughly investigated the complaint and confirmed the validity of the complaints made against the communist-and-leader. Essential educational steps were taken as a result of the investigation. Officer A. Panasenko, a CPSU member, was sternly informed of the deficiencies in his work with people, and it was demanded that he combine great demandingness of subordinates with concern for them.

Many districts, groups of forces and fleets have begun devoting greater attention to satisfying the requests and needs of the servicemen and to eliminating the causes of complaints. All of this is having a good effect on the mood of the people and helping to create a wholesome moral climate in the military and

labor collectives. Ultimately, it is having a positive effect on the fulfillment of combat and political training plans and pre-congress socialist commitments and is contributing to the strengthening of military discipline and the development of service and public-political activeness in the personnel.

Systematic analysis is increasingly becoming established in the practices employed by commanders and political organs for working with letters, requests and complaints from servicemen and members of their families. It calls for the regular study of incoming reports, their "geography," the categories of people submitting them and what has made it necessary for people to turn to the specific authorities for help, and for specifying and implementing specific organizational and educational measures to eliminate the shortcomings. This kind of analysis makes it possible to clearly see positive and negative trends developing in the moral climate of the units and subunits and in the work style of commanders, chiefs, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, to consider the opinion of the fightingmen on the state of affairs at the garrisons and on the quality of the ideological and educational measures being effected, and to promptly and flexibly focus efforts on the resolution of those problems which are troubling the people the most.

We need to continue striving persistently to see that the conclusions drawn from the analyses of letters, complaints, suggestions and requests are backed up with specific action--improving general conditions for the personnel or the operation of the service or enterprise, bringing to strict account an official who has violated the law or satisfying an individual's valid requests, efficiently resolving a conflict or having people's controllers conduct an in-depth investigation. The people are grateful that their voice has been heard. All of this is further reinforcing their willingness and their desire to combat shortcomings, to improve their work style and to work with determination to eliminate everything hampering progress, the establishment of new and progressive things and the creation of a normal moral situation in the collectives.

Experience has shown that the various authorities receive the smallest number of complaints and critical reports from those units and subunits in which the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol committees and bureaus make active use of the entire range of methods of studying public opinion: talks, meetings, conferences, general political days, evenings of questions and answers, open-letter days, polls of the personnel, reception of people on personal matters, material from army and navy periodicals, and so forth. What is important is that most of the officials not only register the reports but also organize investigations into them promptly, within the established periods of time, issue the necessary instructions, monitor their implementation and inform the people who have submitted the complaints or critical reports. This is an efficient and earnest approach in keeping with the contemporary requirements for a restructuring of the work style. It is becoming a reliable tool for improving the moral climate in the collective and developing responsibility in the people.

The commanders and chiefs who bear personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the given section have special responsibility in the matter of

working with letters, requests and complaints. We know that when a communist in charge thoroughly investigates a request from a subordinate, is able to assess a suggestion for improving things or has derived a lesson for himself from a critical report, every individual in the collective has a greater desire to work better and demonstrate greater creativity and initiative in the performance of his duties.

Recently, for example, the editors received a letter from Major V. Kuznetsov. He told how the training process was being improved in the subunit under his command. The author of the letter reported that it was impossible to resolve pressing problems involved in improving the training process without help from the unit commander and staff, since substantial adjustments had to be made both in the training of the specialists and in the way in which the actual training facilities were used. The officer was forced to go to the unit commander. The latter listened carefully to his subordinate. He promised to look into everything and to help. The very next day the commander visited Major Kuznetsov's subunit and thoroughly studied the situation and suggestions for improving combat readiness. A unit order was issued. The training process in the subunit was made more effective, and the actual training facilities began to be used more productively. When one knows that such a sensitive attitude is being taken in the party manner toward oneself and one's service concerns, the author of the letter concluded, one grudges neither effort nor time for the common cause.

But has this kind of truly sensitive handling of the people, their letters and requests been established everywhere? Not yet. The editors receive letters imbued with profound human distress about someone's callousness or inattentiveness. One of them came from Reserve Major A. Krasnyanskiy. Among other things, he reported that he had decided to go to see one of the responsible officials about a housing matter. Despite the fact that he was ill, he traveled many hundreds of kilometers and finally arrived at his destination. He sat in the chief's reception room more than an hour. He was still not received, however. And then, on the move, as they say, Comrade Krasnyanskiy received advice which he did not need.

Deficiencies in working with letters, requests and complaints from fighting-men were revealed in a number of units in the Far East Military District, among others. Officials there do not always promptly consider incoming verbal or written appeals or requests and frequently delay taking necessary steps in response to reports from servicemen, blue- and white-collar workers.

Here is an example. The magazine editors received a letter from Guards Captain S. Rakovich in which he reported that Lieutenant V. Bulygin is negligent in the performance of his service duties, that he is an alcohol abuser and commits extremely gross infractions in the accounting and the storage of materiel, but that the formation's command element is not taking the necessary steps with respect to him and has rejected the unit commander's recommendation that the officer be held materially accountable. The editors informed the appropriate officials. They have not received a reply, however.

We still have cases in which complaints and requests are sent to the individuals whose actions are the objects of complaint. This causes the people

to turn to central agencies and generates numerous additional investigations and re-investigations. When officials handle complaints and requests with responsibility, however, the vast majority of them can be resolved locally.

It is part of the duties of commanders, political workers and other officials to receive visitors. Direct contact between an official and the people makes it possible for him to thoroughly study the moods, requests and needs of the servicemen, blue- and white-collar workers and members of their families, to promptly resolve problems, to prevent undesirable developments in relations among people and to make necessary adjustments in his own work style and that of his subordinates.

Most of the military units, establishments, enterprises and organizations strictly observe the established procedure for receiving visitors and carefully investigate every complaint and request. Investigations are conducted at the site when necessary, and essential practical steps are taken without delay. The monitoring of the fulfillment of decisions adopted by commanders and chiefs on the basis of talks with people during visits has recently been stepped up significantly.

Lieutenant Colonel N. Semenov, commander of one of the outstanding military construction units, takes precisely this responsible approach to the matter. The officer-and-communist always receives visitors in the most genial atmosphere. The commander carefully hears out the individual, thoroughly studies his problems and tries to understand precisely what has caused the visitor to make the complaint or request. Tactical steps are always taken without delay. At the same time, however, hasty decisions contrary to laws or regulations are never made. When it is necessary, all of the details of the matter are thoroughly discussed with the heads of services, military legal experts and the most competent financial and medical workers.

Unfortunately, some officials are not yet correctly resolving questions having to do with receiving visitors. Certain leaders sometimes shift this matter to deputies who do not have the authority necessary for actually resolving questions. The days and hours set for receiving visitors are not observed in some units and establishments. Visitors are sometimes given non-specific answers, sometimes empty promises, and this produces justified criticism from the people and produces unhealthy attitudes in the collective. Time and again, when people appeal to the appropriate officials, they hear: "Your question goes beyond the bounds of our authority." or "We do not have the authority and cannot investigate your complaint."

A decision cannot be made on every request immediately or locally, of course. This does not relieve the individual in charge of the duty to think and seek a solution, however, to identify the authorities authorized to provide the necessary assistance.

Political organs and party organizations have a large role in the work performed with letters and requests. Their militancy, principle and efficiency in organizing the indoctrinational work, their ability to react to a beneficial initiative or a critical word from the communists with sensitivity and

their ability to effectively influence the attitude of an individual who has gone astray in some way--all of these things determine the moral climate in the collective, the degree of geniality in relations among its members and the effectiveness of the struggle against those who deviate from legality and the regulations. And when the political organ and the party organization take a clearly defined position of principle, the formation, unit or subunit has far fewer people offended in some way, fewer false rumors and innuendoes. When people have the support of their party organization, they receive thorough answers there and are not forced to turn to higher authorities.

The intensification of legal propaganda in the forces is highly important for improving the work performed with letters, the reviewing of requests and complaints, the elimination of excessive correspondence and the prevention of unfounded complaints. The better the servicemen know Soviet laws, regulations, instructions, orders and manuals, the more competently they will function in difficult situations and the fewer will be the causes of conflicts.

Many letters to staffs, political organs, newspaper and magazine editors contain extremely well substantiated critical comments about officials and offer specific suggestions for improving their work style. Most of the leaders respond correctly to criticism and derive the necessary practical conclusions from it. However, we still have many who accept criticism of themselves in an unhealthy manner. Such cases should be most resolutely condemned, and those guilty of persecution because of criticism should be strictly punished. People who are able honestly and openly to indicate shortcomings and those to blame for them should receive reliable and all-around support.

The central military press, district, fleet and group newspapers work with letters in highly diverse ways. Most of these organs precisely monitor the treatment of letters and take essential practical steps in response to the letters within the established periods of time. The systematic analysis of incoming mail and the submission of this material to the appropriate political organs have justified themselves entirely. Facilities for receiving the public, which function in many editorial offices, are playing an increasingly significant role.

The newspapers BOYEVOYE ZNAMYA of the Central Asian Military District, SOVETSKIY SOLDAT of the Central Group of Forces and FLAG RODINY of the Black Sea Fleet have accumulated many positive things in the work performed with letters, requests, complaints and suggestions. They regularly carry articles in which readers receive answers to the most diverse, troubling questions.

Some editorial offices, however, do not adhere to the established time periods for reviewing requests and reports from readers and make only superficial investigations. This produces justified dissatisfaction in the people. Such cases should be the subject of most serious analysis and demanding discussion at meetings of the editorial boards and in the party organizations of the press organs.

The military commissars and the chiefs of political sections of the military commissariats have a great deal to do to further improve the handling of

letters and the receiving of visitors. Sensitivity and attention to letters and requests, a high level of legal competence in the investigation of matters, the ability to resolve them in close communication with unit command elements, party, soviet and management bodies and a desire to finish what has been started--primarily this is what should distinguish the work style of leaders at this level.

The work performed with letters has become even more important on the eve of the 27th CPSU Congress. This is because of the paramount importance of issues being brought up for discussion at the congress, the nature of the period we are living through and the newness and scope of the tasks facing the society. Suggestions and requests from people will help to gain a more thorough understanding of the situation which has developed and to correctly assess decisions made by the leaders at all levels with respect to accomplishing the tasks set by the party.

The intensity of the socialist competition for a fitting reception for the 27th CPSU Congress is increasing today. Fightingmen of the army and navy are striving for new achievements in the military training and are actively seeking reserves for enhancing the combat readiness and strengthening discipline. Everything possible is being done to successfully conclude the current training year, to fulfill combat and political training plans and programs and the commitments which have been accepted, completely and well, and to orient the servicemen toward the achievement of maximum results. The people are self-critically assessing what has been achieved, boldly revealing deficiencies and submitting many suggestions for increasing demandingness and organization and improving the quality of the training and indoctrinational process. They are revealing their innermost thoughts and aspirations during this pre-congress period in letters to commanders, political organs and other levels of authority. The better the work with letters and requests from the people is performed, the more solid will be the ties of commanders and political organs with the masses, the greater will be the service and the public-political activeness of the fightingmen and the better will they accomplish the tasks set for the Armed Forces by the Communist Party.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1985.

11499

CSO: 1801/58

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

EDITOR'S INVESTIGATION OF LETTER NOTED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sept 85 (signed to press 4 Sept 85) p 92

[Article under the "From the Editor's Mailbag" rubric: "Why Conceal One's Identity?"]

[Text] The magazine's editorial office receives hundreds of letters from various cities and from garrisons near and far. The letters attest to the increased social activeness, principle and responsibility of the people and to their concern for the common cause.

The editor's mailbag contains letters in which the authors reveal certain deficiencies in the organization of the combat training, the service and the indoctrination of the fightingmen, and publicize negative things. And special attention is given to such letters. The disclosure of gaps, omissions and deficiencies and concern for eliminating things preventing advancement constitute an important prerequisite for improving matters, after all. The editorial board therefore responds immediately to every warning signal. Correspondents travel to the sites in response to some letters, and in many cases the letters are reviewed by commanders and by the pertinent party organs, and necessary steps are taken at the request of the editorial office.

The editor's mailbag sometimes contains letters of a different kind, however.

Recently, such a letter arrived from the Voronezh Garrison. It reported cases of abuse of service position and rudeness to subordinates by Major L., a CPSU member. It also stated that there had been a violation of the standards governing party life in the subunit's party organization.

Our correspondent visited the garrison. The inspection showed that everything described with such anger in the letter was idle fabrication. There proved to be no basis for the attempt to cast aspersions either upon the entire collective or upon the honor and merit of the officer-and-communist. The authors of the letter preferred to remain anonymous, however.

There was also alarm in every line of a letter received from the Zhitomir Higher Order of the October Revolution, Red Banner Radio Electronics School of Air Defense imeni Lenin Komsomol. Its author, N. Averyanov, reported on

alleged unfitting conduct by one of the communists in charge at the school. He even cited specific examples.

The letter was investigated at the site. It turned out that these facts also did not conform to reality and that the author was a fictitious person.

Was this also slander, or malevolence? Or perhaps it was an attempt to get back at an individual for some personal grudge? Do such attempts not cost too dearly, however? A considerable number of people are involved and time is spent in investigating reports, after all. Considerable funds are spent. Nor can we ignore the moral cost.

When we study cases in which an individual writing a letter to the editorial office does not report his real name or does not sign it at all, we can draw a definite conclusion. An honorable individual, a principled communist, a real champion of justice, will not mislead people, will not obscure the situation, so to speak. And he will not try to hide behind someone else's or a fictitious name, but will report the deficiencies without fear. The 26th CPSU Congress underscored the fact that those who come forth with fair and earnest criticism have no reason to conceal their identity. Such calumnies, the recent session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out, are incompatible with communist moral principles, and they should have no place in our life.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1985.

11499

CSO: 1801/58

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

WIFE FAULTS PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN COLLAPSE OF OFFICER'S CAREER

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 85 (signed to press 4 Sept 85) pp 58-62

[Article by Maj N. Litvinov under the "Morals, Duty, Discipline" rubric:
"The Cost of Connivance: Follow-Up on a Letter"]

[Text] Lyubov Danilovna Bogdanova asked the question straightforwardly in her letter, and it naturally required a specific answer. How could it happen, she asked, that my husband (now her ex-husband) Lieutenant Colonel Bogdanov, who until recently was considered to be a good political worker and a promising officer, has lost everything: the respect of his comrades, his prestige, his family...? Yes, even his family. We divorced, because life had become intolerable: He drank, insulted.... Just why did this happen? Was it not a result of the fact that too much was permitted him, that he did not bear responsibility for his actions, actions which were not always proper? Why did no one tell him the truth to his face, not caution him that he could make a serious error? His decline occurred before the eyes of many communists, after all....

It happened this way. Officer V. Bogdanov was promoted to a higher position from that of deputy battalion commander for political affairs. A year and a half went by, and during that time officer Bogdanov, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, compromised himself in every possible way, as they say. He was punished by the party (he was issued a stern reprimand, which was entered in his record) and demoted. And he was returned... to that very collective and to that very position from which he had been promoted.

When we investigated the situation, I heard two opinions. Officer L. Vlasov, regimental commander, stated hesitantly: "In general, there were no complaints about Bogdanov before he was awarded the military rank of lieutenant colonel." He thought for a minute and then added: "However, Bogdanov was far from ideal when he joined our regiment...." The chief of the political section in the formation of which the battalion is a part stated it more firmly, however: "It all began for Bogdanov not in our formation, but in the regiment."

Just what happened to the political worker? Why did such changes occur in his life? It would be difficult to give simple answers to these questions, although it is obvious that he himself is mostly to blame. He is the one who

②

picked up the bottle and began drinking even during duty hours. He is the one who permitted himself to handle service questions in a superficial manner and consequently, to grossly violate military regulations. He forgot about his military duty and his duty to his family. He forgot the fact that every communist must adhere to high moral principles himself and set an example in this respect for those around him. He forfeited the right to bear the great title of party member, which means that he also forfeited the right to educate subordinates. As we know, the educator influences people with his behavior, with his entire lifestyle. "In order to truly educate," M.I. Kalinin said, "one must not only know his job well, but must also have a pure soul."

This has to be discussed not just to show the causes of moral decline of an officer-and-political worker, causes which depended upon him. It is also necessary in order to underscore the fact that those around him--commanders, senior political workers and party collectives--did not have a right to relieve themselves of responsibility for him.

The letter to the editors has made it necessary to talk about the demandingness and principle of Bogdanov's chiefs, about the party approach to the selection and placement of cadres. We have to talk about that which is particularly important to discuss today, when we are turning again and again to materials of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, whose position with respect to the work performed with the cadres is very clear: Heightened attention must be given to such a key element of party work as the selection, placement and education of the cadres and the systematic implementation of the party line of intensifying demandingness and increasing responsibility for the assigned job.

In connection with this, it would be appropriate to ask whether Bogdanov's chiefs and senior political workers always thoroughly and extensively studied his moral qualities and efficiency and whether they assessed them adequately from a standpoint of principle when they promoted the officer to the higher position.

"Bogdanov," the chief of the formation political section said during our first conversation, "was a promising worker. He performed fairly well in the battalion, but as deputy regimental commander for political affairs.... We promoted a man irreproachable in every respect, but what was he like when he returned"?

The promoted man did return after he had bungled things in the regiment, that is true. He continued to go down hill by inertia in the battalion, however. He was issued 12 (!) disciplinary penalties within a year there. He also received his second stern reprimand there, which was entered on his record. On 25 May 1985 a party commission under the formation political section decreed: "Comrade V.M. Bogdanov is to be expelled from the CPSU for discrediting the great title of CPSU member, for undermining the prestige of an officer-and-political worker, for the low level of his political and indoctrinational work in the battalion, for leaving the garrison without authorization and for deceiving command."

It was soon determined that the decision was invalid, however, since it grossly violated the procedure defined in the CPSU Charter for expelling communists from the party ranks, for one thing. For another, the party investigation was not fully documented. It was therefore necessary to take up Bogdanov's case once again a month later, after a party commission in the district political directorate had intervened.

What does this fact indicate? First of all, it indicates that the members of the party commission were not sufficiently demanding of themselves, that a formal, superficial approach was taken to the assessment of the communist's efficiency and moral qualities and to the determination of such a difficult question as the exclusion of a CPSU member from the party ranks.

Naturally, this fact had to make people think about how the members of the battalion party bureau and workers in the formation political section had investigated his situation 2 1/2 years previously, when the question of Bogdanov's advancement to the position of deputy regimental commander for political affairs was being determined. Was Bogdanov truly irreproachable at that time, as the chief of the political section maintains?

The officer already had some serious transgressions at that time, it has been learned. Just 5 months prior to Bogdanov's promotion, he was issued three reprimands and a warning that he was not completely measuring up to service requirements. There were various reasons: irresponsibility in the performance of his service duties, rudeness toward a superior chief, personal lack of discipline and the ignoring of instructions from senior chiefs.

The primary party organization, which was headed at that time by Major A. Maystrenko, had to know about this. Nonetheless, when Bogdanov's record was discussed at a meeting of the party bureau in connection with his promotion to a higher position, none of the Communists even brought up the infractions which the political worker had committed. The party bureau members all voted approval of his record, in which Bogdanov's deficiencies were for some reason transformed into merits: "...demonstrated himself to be conscientious and efficient, polite with people..." etc., etc.

It turned out that in the party bureau of the primary organization, where a climate of great demandingness, exactingness and principle must always prevail, such a climate did not exist. Not a single individual stated straightforwardly and openly: "Bogdanov does not deserve the favorable reference."

And what about the formation political section? Perhaps the people there tried to make some sort of changes? Everyone knew about Bogdanov's penalties, after all. "We agree with the party's reference. An industrious communist with initiative"--this is what the deputy chief of the formation political section wrote. It was Communist Yu. Novozhilov at that time.

An unusual pattern emerges: A person commits one precipitate act after another and goes against the officer's conscience and party ethics, for which he is not punished but promoted. Deliberate or not, they were teaching Bogdanov that he could do as he pleased and they would "cover for him." And they did cover, as people do where considerations of "expediency" are substituted for principle.

The quotation marks are there for a reason. The reference was written in such a way that it revealed not the individual's character and his deeds but the circumstances under which it was written. To be more precise, it showed an attempt to get rid of an individual by any means, even by promoting him to a higher position.

And so, Bogdanov became a deputy regimental commander for political affairs.

Officer L. Vlasov, the regimental commander, knew that the individual being advanced and joining his unit was far from the most worthy. The party collective also knew that Bogdanov had had failures and deficiencies at his former job. They should have stated this straightforwardly and halted the decline. They did not state it, did not halt the decline. Instead, they began... issuing Bogdanov one expression of gratitude after another. In short, they took the easy way "to maintain" prestige. Prestige, which did not exist, because prestige is not an appendage to a position of responsibility and is not given along with the position. It is given to no one at all. It has to be earned and deserved. And it is not earned once and for all. It has to be constantly reaffirmed with all of one's conduct and actions, affirmed with deeds.

Bogdanov should have thought about this and derived the appropriate conclusions. But no, he did not think about it and did not draw conclusions. Surrounded by undeserved honor, he got a false idea of his own importance and began to believe in his own infallibility and impunity. He began to show up on the job in an intoxicated state. (And why not, when there had been a drinking party the evening before: either on the occasion of a promotion of one of the senior officers in the regiment to the next military rank or someone's appointment to a higher position, or to honor the arrival of sponsors from a kolkhoz?) He began borrowing money from subordinates. When he began causing fights at home, however, his wife went to see the commander. She asked for one thing: that they apply pressure to her husband.

Action should have been taken, it would appear. Firm and determined action. After all, our party's line with respect to this matter is clear: There can be no compromising with respect to those who deviate from party moral standards, those who behave unfittingly in their personal life and in the family. Criticism is a tested method for this sort of thing. Severe and principled criticism. Unfortunately, however, the party bureau did not use it. Only the secretary and the commander spoke with Bogdanov--behind closed doors, as they say. This produced various false rumors among the Communists about the existence, they said, of two kinds of discipline: one for those in charge, another for the rank-and-file Communists.

Rumors began, but Bogdanov did not listen to the advice of the commander or the secretary of the party bureau and continued his old ways. This is when officer Vlasov recommended that his deputy for political affairs be advanced to a new position. And an admirable reference--both service and party--was appropriately provided.

Here are excerpts from the service reference dated 8 April 1984: "During the time he has served... he has proved himself to be a disciplined and efficient

officer. He knows the duties involved in his position and performs them well.... He looks into the needs and requests of subordinates.... He constantly studies the performance, the political and moral qualities of the officers and warrant officers.... He is demanding of himself and of subordinates. He enjoys prestige in the collective. He is morally stable.... He measures up to the position he holds."

It is perfectly apparent that this reference was written for purposes of getting rid of Bogdanov, to put it mildly. It was written personally by officer Vlasov, unit commander.

"Why did you write this?" I asked him.

"You should have seen the reference he came to us with!" was the answer. "It was brilliant, even though we knew for sure what he was actually like. Should we have to pay for what someone else has done?"

It is all "coming home" again. This is the price of lack of principle, the price of connivance.

But the party bureau members went even further. In their description of Bogdanov, they mentioned among other positive qualities the fact that the political worker, according to them, was modest in his daily life, even though they had received alarming reports more than once about his unfitting behavior.

Those in the political section of the garrison's special units concurred with this party reference. They did so even though they had to know what Bogdanov was really like. Just a few weeks previously, he had rendered account in the political section, and serious deficiencies in the officer's work had been pointed out to him. Nonetheless, Major G. Reshetnikov, a worker in the political section of the special units, wrote the following: "I concur with the party's reference for Komsomol (!!--author) member Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Bogdanov."

Notice that he said Komsomol member and not CPSU member. This was apparently merely a slip of the pen. It attests to the formal approach taken to the affirmation of a party reference, however.

It remains only to be said that this is how Bogdanov was recommended for service abroad. And no one thought about the fact that an unworthy individual was being advanced to the important section. This is not surprising: The line between what is and what is not permitted is obliterated where people forget about the basic sense of party duty. He lacked discipline--he became disciplined. He had a reputation for being immodest--he will gain a reputation for modesty. He was considered irresponsible--he will become regarded as having a sense of responsibility.

And Bogdanov would have departed happily for his new station, if he had not soon violated our moral standards again while out of the unit, during an exam session (he was studying at a university by correspondence). The political section of the special units learned of his drunkenness and his unfitting behavior in his daily life. Action had to be brought against Communist Bogdanov.

Once again, references--both service and party--went out from the regiment. This time, however, to a party commission.

An excerpt from the service reference dated 27 June 1984: "...Studies the personnel superficially.... After receiving his next military rank (June 1983--author), he began performing his service duties negligently. He began borrowing money from the officers and warrant officers, giving them IOUs, and did not repay the loans for a long time.... He lost all prestige among the personnel.... His moral qualities and performance do not measure up to the position he holds. It would be best to use him in positions in which he would not be dealing with personnel."

The party reference was restrained in the very same vein. This time, Major Reshetnikov, who conducted a party investigation, assessed Bogdanov's behavior more objectively. At a meeting of the party commission under the political section of special units, held on 3 July 1984, a stern reprimand was issued to Communist Bogdanov for serious deficiencies in his work, for ignoring instructions from senior chiefs and for violating party and moral standards of behavior, which was entered in his record.

It has to be said that this was perfectly fair. What is surprising about it? A meeting of the party commission discussed Communist Bogdanov's moral image but considered it unnecessary to speak of the morality of the Communists in charge in the regiment, of their low level of responsibility and principle. Nor did they ask Communist Reshetnikov why he had shown a lack of principle. They should have asked him, however, reminded him of the party's demand that the Communist-and-leader, vested with great authority, must not deviate from our morals one iota.

Officer Vlasov did deviate from them.... Certain Communists at higher levels also did so. Naturally, this had to affect the level of political and indoctrinational work in the unit and the moral climate in the collective. Deviations from the CPSU Charter, which charges us with developing criticism and self-criticism, boldly revealing shortcomings and striving to correct them, and combatting ostentation and complacency, had undesirable repercussions in the party organization.

The following conclusion suggests itself: Morality and principle are established through morality and principle. One only has to circumvent this principle, and nothing good can be expected. Officer Vlasov, the regimental commander, circumvented it. He was followed by members of the party bureau headed by Major A. Brench. I was unable to speak with him, unfortunately. He is now serving in a higher position at a different site. I would have liked to ask him several questions.

Why, for example, did the party bureau members give Bogdanov a good reference when the question of sending him abroad was being decided? Why and how did the different kind of reference appear on the desk of the party commission under the political section of special units literally 2 months later, when the matter of taking action against Bogdanov came up? Incidentally, I did ask certain party bureau members about this. Officers G. Yegorshin and V. Surkov, among others. I asked them why they had changed their opinion so abruptly. They told me they did not remember or did not know, as though this had not even been discussed in

the party bureau. The negative reference was sent to a meeting of the party commission, however. We even have the number of the report--11. And the date is indicated--29 June. It is not recorded in the minutes of meetings of the unit party bureau, however.

What does this mean? Was it carelessness in writing up the minutes? Or is it proof that the reference was in fact not discussed in the party bureau? One thing is clear in any case: Once again, everything done was contrary to the established standards of party life.

Let us repeat that Lieutenant Colonel Bogdanov himself was primarily to blame for everything which happened. If we look at everything from a party position, however, we have to admit frankly and openly that such things as lack of principle and connivance, servility and bureaucracy, which are alien to the standards of party life, made themselves felt in the military collectives in which Bogdanov served. As a result, the party organizations were unable to conduct a full, uncompromising battle for the pure and honorable image of the Communist.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1985.

11499

CSO: 1801/58

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LIMITS OF CRITICISM, SELF-CRITICISM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Col V. Lavrik, candidate of technical sciences, senior scientific associate: "Develop Criticism"]

[Text] The draft CPSU Bylaws with proposed amendments preserves previous provisions relating to criticism and self-criticism. In my view, however, the complexity and scale of the tasks of building communism require a broadening of party members' rights and duties regarding the use of such a powerful weapon as criticism and self-criticism. The April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum oriented us toward this by demanding Bolshevik frankness in discussing pressing problems.

It must be admitted straight out that some party members who are managers sometimes quite freely interpret the provision of the "Instruction to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy" that criticism of the orders and instructions of commanders and superiors is not allowed. There are cases where this provision is used to suppress criticism, even if its fire is directed against deficiencies in training and indoctrinating the personnel, in party-political work, and in servicemen's everyday material support.

Or take the following point. A superior officer present at a party meeting carefully listens to critical comments and neatly writes them down. Later, after taking the floor, he thanks the party members for the frank discussion and exacting analysis of deficiencies, then suddenly turns the course of his thoughts such that criticism flies like a boomerang toward those who came out with it. It must be said that this is correct in some very rare instances, such as if a speaker criticized others for his own deficiencies. Most often, however, this reflects an attempt to suppress criticism or distort its true meaning.

It seems to me that following the words "offer a decisive rebuff to any attempts to suppress criticism" in subparagraph "i" of paragraph 2 of the draft CPSU Bylaws, we should add "or distortions of its true meaning," and the second proposal of subparagraph "c" in paragraph 3 should be worded as follows: "Persons guilty of suppressing or distorting the true meaning of criticism or of persecuting for criticism are to have party proceedings instituted against them, right up to expulsion from the CPSU."

6904
CSO: 1801/0068

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

GLAVPU CONFERENCE ON PARTY WORK WITH FAMILIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Improve Work with Families"]

[Text] A training methods seminar was held in the Central Soviet Army Club imeni M. V. Frunze for senior instructors for work among servicemen's families of political directorates of branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and officers' clubs. Maj Gen V. Anikovich, chief of the culture and art department of the propaganda and agitation directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, opened the seminar.

Yu. Sokolova, senior instructor of the culture and art department of the propaganda and agitation directorate, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, gave a briefing entitled "Status of the Work of Communist Indoctrination of Members of Servicemen's Families and the Tasks of Improving it in Connection with Preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress." Political directorate instructors V. Saksina, T. Dormidontova, Z. Timakova and others took part in discussing the briefing.

Seminar participants met with V. Tereshkova, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Women; USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut Maj Gen Avn P. Klimuk, chief of the political department of the Cosmonaut Training Center imeni Yu. A. Gagarin; and writer A. Aleksin.

Lt Gen D. Volkogonov, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, spoke at the seminar.

6904

CSO: 1801/70

ARMED FORCES

INTERVIEW WITH COL GEN V. M. ARKHIPOV

Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 6 Nov 85 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen V. M. Arkhipov, Moscow Garrison commander and commander of Order of Lenin Moscow MD, by O. Moskovskiy and V. Pakhomov, on day before parade of Moscow Garrison troops honoring 68th Anniversary of Great October Socialist Revolution, place not given, under rubric "Club of Interesting Meetings": "Parade Commander"]

[Text] Our guest is Col Gen V. M. Arkhipov, garrison commander, commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow MD. Tomorrow he will command the parade of Moscow Garrison troops dedicated to the 68th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

[Arkhipov] "The fact is, I am an old reader of VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA," were the words with which the general began the interview.

[Moskovskiy, Pakhomov] Although you took over the capital district relatively recently...

[Arkhipov] Nevertheless, I was connected with Moscow long ago, since the time I was studying in the Military Academy of Armored troops imeni Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy.

[Moskovskiy, Pakhomov] You probably took part in parades on Red Square as an Academy student?

[Arkhipov] Three times... Later there were studies at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov.

[Moskovskiy, Pakhomov] All units of the MVO [Moscow MD], large and small, are equally dear to you as commander, but perhaps you have a special attachment to one?

[Arkhipov] I won't hide the fact that I keep track of how the Kantemirovka Guards Tank Division imeni Yu. V. Andropov, which I had occasion to command about ten years ago, performs operational training missions. Twice I had the good fortune to open up the march across Red Square by Kantemirovka personnel.

I observed the tankers' exercise in the summer. It is fully understandable that not only people, but combat vehicles as well have been replaced several times since my service in the division, but the young soldiers continue to have an inherent determination to master the sophisticated combat equipment. Expertise is improved in tactical problems and exercises.

It is that way everywhere in the large and small units which I had occasion to visit. The entire service and tenor of life are subordinated to conquering the pinnacles of military proficiency.

[Moskovskiy, Pakhomov] Allegiance to frontlinesmen's traditions probably is manifested in this best of all?

[Arkhipov] Without question. I often have occasion to meet with Great Patriotic War participants. They are convinced that their grandsons and great-grandsons are worthy heirs of the glory of older generations.

Capt S. Yefremov, in the past a motorized rifle battalion commander, will pass by in the parade formation of students from the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. A typical representative of contemporary officers, he was awarded the Order of Red Star and the "Distinction in Military Service" medal 1st Class for successful performance of military duty in giving international assistance in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The heroes' names are in the memory and hearts of today's servicemen. We have many companies where especially distinguished Great Patriotic War participants who fell for the Motherland's freedom and independence are listed forever on the rolls. Here is a very fresh example of the solicitous attitude toward the memory of war veterans. The name of the person in question is well known to the readers of VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, especially to Muscovites of the older generation.

By order of the USSR minister of defense, the name of Mar Armored Trps P. P. Poluboyarov was conferred on the Shepetovka Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Guards Tank Regiment. Having begun the war as a major, Pavel Pavlovich ended it as a lieutenant general and became a Hero of the Soviet Union. He crossed Red Square in a tank on 7 November 1945, during the first peacetime October parade. In a photo report on that holiday, VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA published a photo of Poluboyarov in the open turret of a command vehicle. Returning to that photograph thirty years later, the newspaper published a talk with this military leader. The marshal related that N. Gorin, a former Moscow driver, drove Tank No 0460 across Red Square with the colors of the regiment which had brought up ten HSU's.

[Moskovskiy, Pakhomov] Have you worn a military uniform for a long time?

[Arkhipov] Since 1952. I will anticipate your next question: Are there military persons among my nearest relatives? Well, I will answer that right off: No. I come from a worker's family. My grandfather was a railroader and my father worked 40 years as a train engineer. During the war he ran trains with military cargoes.

Our family lived in Kazakhstan, in the station of Chelka in Aktyubinsk Oblast. I dreamed of entering an institute after school. I wasn't the only one: almost all my classmates were preparing for the very same thing. After I finished tenth grade, however, I heard my mother say: "As disappointing as it may be for us, Volodya, we can't allow you to study further. It is hard for your father to place you seven children on your feet; go to work, and then see what happens." So I became a lathe operator and later received a notice from the military commissariat. I haven't taken the uniform off since then.

[Moskovskiy, Pakhomov] Where did you study after first-term service?

[Arkhipov] I completed the Tashkent Higher Tank Command School imeni Twice Honored HSU Mar Armored Trps P. S. Rybalko. Former classmates are plowing the soil, building houses, and planting trees, but I chose the profession of safeguarding the land, sky and sun.

How our great Motherland lives is always near and dear to us in the military. Thousands of threads connect servicemen not only with families, but also with labor collectives where they had occasion to work before being called up.

It is pleasing for me as a general, as well as for the men, to receive news from the parental home. Father went on pension, and after active duty four brothers returned to their working trades. It is fully understandable that they, like all those who go into the reserve, brought with them to their labor collectives the knowledge, skill and discipline received in the Army.

My brothers tell in detail about their work. They are indignant over the militarist preparations in Washington, which are very dangerous for the cause of peace, and they inquire about the Army routine. It is not just I who must answer to my people, write my father and brothers about our constant readiness, and keep the powder dry.

My sons also became military persons. One of them, a senior lieutenant, is a battalion chief of staff in the Central Asian MD. The youngest is a lieutenant. After completing the Alma-Ata Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Mar SU I. S. Konev with a gold medal, he is commanding a platoon in the North Caucasus MD.

[Moskovskiy, Pakhomov] Say a few words about the upcoming parade.

[Arkhipov] Military academy students; military school cadets; composite columns of the Airborne Troops, border guards, naval infantry, and internal security forces; Suvorov and Nakhimov cadets; and the personnel of air defense and missile subunits will cross Red Square.

The march-past by troops of the Moscow Garrison and representatives of famed units and subunits of various combat arms and branches of the Armed Forces is a report to the party Central Committee, the Soviet government, and all the people about the USSR Armed Forces' constant readiness to defend the Motherland's peace, labor, freedom, independence and happiness.

6904

CSO: 1801/0068

ARMED FORCES

OBITUARY: MAJ GEN MASLOV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Nov 85 p 4

[Obituary of Maj Gen Ivan Semenovich Maslov, signed by I. N. Shkadov, D. A. Volkogonov, V. N. Dutov, I. V. Balabay, L. S. Chuvakhin, V. N. Babyev, A. I. Borisov, A. I. Kotlyar, G. A. Mostepanenko, M. I. Sergeyev, A. N. Berzin and V. I. Vasilevskiy]

[Text] Maj Gen Ivan Semenovich Maslov, deputy chief of USSR Ministry of Defense Administrative Management Directorate, died after a serious, lengthy illness. He dedicated all his conscious life to selfless service to the Soviet Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, of which he was a member since 1943.

Maslov was born on 6 September 1920 in the village of Veydelevka, Voronezh Oblast, to a peasant family. He volunteered for the Red Army from the schoolbench in 1941. Maslov participated in the defense of Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War.

Maslov held the position of chief of motor transport service, and was deputy chief of the administrative management directorate for a long while in the postwar years.

He was constantly distinguished by a high sense of responsibility for the assigned job, exceptional diligence, determination and initiative. For service to the Motherland Maslov was awarded the Order of Patriotic War 1st Class, Order of Labor Red Banner, two orders of Red Star, the "Honor Emblem" order, and many USSR medals.

The bright memory of Ivan Semenovich Maslov will be preserved in our hearts forever.

6904

CSO: 1801/0068

ARMED FORCES

COMMAND, CONTROL: PROBLEMS IN INTRODUCING COMPUTERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Ye. Kolibernov, chief of Military Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev, doctor of military sciences: "Microcomputers: Problems of Introduction"]

[Text] The new draft wording of the CPSU Program calls the cardinal acceleration of scientific-technical progress a fundamental issue of the party's economic strategy. Its solution requires imaginative searches, an innovative approach to matters, and bold, energetic actions of all of our cadres, including the military. It also demands a further improvement in the very system of personnel training and indoctrination, and above all a more active introduction of computer technology into the training process. Today it is already impossible to train highly skilled military personnel capable of successfully accomplishing difficult operational training missions, and to keep in step with the development of military affairs without such an introduction and thorough mastery of computers. Take the following example.

The plan of the command and staff exercise with students of the Military Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev stipulated: In the role of chief of engineering service of a large unit [soyedineniye] make the decision for engineer support to unit [chast] combat actions.

To substantiate the decision it was necessary to determine the scope of engineer work, personnel and resources, and the time needed to fortify jumping-off positions, make passages in "enemy" obstacles, prepare routes of advance, and prepare and maintain crossings over a water obstacle.

Calculations on all these missions using the usual method would have required several hours. That much time hardly will be given the chief of engineering service under modern combat conditions, and that much time also was not given the students. They coped with the assigned task in a matter of minutes using small microcomputer calculation programs.

This example was taken from the training practice of academy students. In my view, it persuasively proves that today one cannot get by at all in the training process without computer equipment. Life itself and troop practice demands this. Those times are long past when a commander could make an

"eyeball" decision. Saturation of the troops with sophisticated types of equipment and weapons requires a scientific substantiation of a command decision. The more accurate the calculations, the more reliable the decision. Our commanders were deeply aware of this truth in the war years, and I had an opportunity to be vividly persuaded of this while serving in various positions. I had to perform calculations for hours or even days. I remember well the preparations for an assault crossing of the Oder River. We got the sector where the river has two channels: West Oder and East Oder. The interfluvial area was very marshy and cut up by a large number of canals. We staff officers of the 2d Belorussian Front Engineer Troops had to perform several versions of calculations in order to determine the optimum one, with four to six hours spent on each calculation. We worked for days without sleep or rest, but disregarded this. The important thing was to propose to the command element that engineer support version which would guarantee success with fewest losses.

Saturation of the troops with very sophisticated weapon and combat equipment systems and the high dynamism of combat actions under present-day conditions made it necessary to automate many labor-intensive command and control processes. The use of automated command and control systems (ASUV) frees the commander and staff of cumbersome mathematical calculations, thus giving them time for the creative work of organizing for combat. But in order for the automated command and control system to be able to function successfully, it must rely on a network of primary data units located at the lowest control level. In other words, the entire system of control from top to bottom must be based on the use of computer equipment as the basic tool for processing large volumes of data in real time.

The opinion has been implanted in some officers, however, that use of computers is advisable and possible only on higher staffs. This is an obvious fallacy which must be resolutely overcome. There must be a psychological reorientation of such people aimed at persuading every officer that mastery of a personal computer is just as necessary to us as the ability to read a topographic map, and it is necessary today, not just in the near future. This is a demand of the time, and demanded by life itself.

The party places great emphasis, among steps aimed at accelerating scientific-technical progress, on the production of new generations of highly effective equipment, and particularly computer equipment. The draft "Basic Directions of the USSR's Economic and Social Development during 1986-1990 and for the Period up to the Year 2000" state: "Organize the mass production of personal computers. Assure a growth in the production volume of computer equipment by 2-2.3 times. Build up the scale of using modern, highly productive computers of all classes at high rates."

As we see, computerization is a statewide task, and it is already being implemented. A new training subject, "Fundamentals of Information Science and Computer Technology," was introduced in secondary schools this year among the steps to implement this task, but we cannot wait for those secondary school graduates who are beginning to master the abc's of information science and computers today to come into the Army. I know that cadets at many military schools are given thorough knowledge and skills of working with computer

equipment, but not at all schools. This deficiency is not always compensated for to a proper extent among the troops as well. I can judge this from academy graduates: some of them still believe that there is no need to use computer equipment at a level such as the regiment or battalion.

It must be said that at the tactical level such a mistake is inherent both to some engineer service officers and to combined-arms commanders, although the need for such knowledge is quite obvious for commanders and staff officers inasmuch as they often have occasion to run across problems for which a computer is extremely necessary in order to solve them.

Let's give the following example. A regiment was ordered to take up a defense in an exercise. It was known that the "enemy" could deliver a nuclear strike against the regimental defense sector. The approximate yield of the presumed strike can be determined and the nature of terrain is known. What fortification of the defense sector must there be in order to assure the subunits' survivability?

It is in itself an easy task, but the usual method of calculations requires considerable time, while the task is accomplished in a matter of minutes with the help of a microcomputer. A good commander obviously will see to it that not only the regimental engineer service chief, but any staff officer can accomplish such tasks in a qualified manner. The fact is that an acute need might arise for this in an actual combat situation and one must be ready for it.

Here is another example. The commander of a defending motorized rifle battalion has to determine the possible losses taken by an attacking enemy tank battalion from mines and from defenders' fire. Or a tank company commander has to determine the time for crossing a river with a given width and current velocity aboard two GSP [tracked self-propelled] ferries... The most basic program is loaded in the microcalculator memory, and an answer to these problems is immediately displayed.

This is in answer to the question of whether or not computer equipment is applicable and necessary in the battalion. I will say right off that it is, and even in the company. I am thoroughly convinced that it must be present at all levels of the command and control system, from high staffs to the company and platoon. Programs for calculating standard tasks performed by units and subunits can be developed by the appropriate military educational institutions or directly by the large and small units [soyedineniye and chast].

We understand the importance and need for introducing computer equipment to the troops and we are trying to arm our students with appropriate knowledge and skills of using computers in military engineering. We are placing primary emphasis on studying mathematical methods of describing various processes and fundamentals of programming, and on instilling practical work skills.

We have created special control points in order to make wider use of the means of automation in the training process. Using these control points, the students can receive answers from the computer center on the display about the effectiveness of decisions they are making on troop engineer support. There

are many enthusiasts on the faculty of the Academy who actively use computers in classes and research. Among them are professors major generals M. Kozlov and T. Salamakhin, colonels V. Kornev, I. Polyakov, B. Yurkov and others.

As we have seen from our own experience, the broad introduction of microcomputers is no simple matter. The primary difficulty lies in the psychological reorientation of people. As a matter of fact, if an instructor has used formulas and a slide rule in calculations for many years, it isn't easy for a person to give up customary methods, but he must. We arrange both special classes and classes within the command training system for command and instructor personnel, and they also work under personal plans. We see that this isn't enough, however, and we have to set up special courses. We still don't have the necessary number of specially equipped auditoriums, and there is a shortage of microcomputers and microcalculators.

I would like to make special mention about our ties with the troops. Programs developed at the Academy for solving operational-tactical problems are undergoing a serious test among the troops. We maintain constant creative contact with some of them on matters of the further introduction of microcomputers into combat training practice. We have occasion to hear not only positive comments about the quality of our programs and methodologies, but also serious criticism, particularly about the cumbersome nature of the input data cards [vkhodnoy formulyar], which require much time for filling out, the insufficient clarity of output data cards, and so on. It happens where our problems are not used at all, since there still are some officers who are "afraid" of computers or simply don't know the substance of the problems and advantages of solving them with computer help.

We would like our students to receive practical reinforcement of their knowledge and skills in the area of microcomputer use during on-the-job training with the troops. Academy students, post-graduate students and instructors as well could assist unit commanders and staff officers in using computer equipment, and microcomputers and calculators above all. Sometimes there is not enough of the equipment with the troops, however, although there is an opportunity to acquire it practically everywhere; the opportunity simply has to be used. In short, the time has come not only to approve of and be pleased by the prospects for scientific-technical progress, but also to introduce its results even today.

6904

CSO: 1801/0068

ARMED FORCES

IMPORT OF, RESISTANCE TO COMPUTERS IN TACTICAL DECISIONMAKING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Pavlov, staff officer of Red Banner Baltic MD: "Use Computers More Fully"]

[Text] The new draft wording of the CPSU Program discusses a rapid renewal of the production apparatus based on foremost technology, including the computerization of production. Microelectronics, computer technology, and the information industry now are called the catalysts of scientific-technical progress. It is now difficult to imagine an industrial enterprise, science establishment or military collective without computers.

But the use of this technology must be more complete. The return from computers rises sharply if enthusiastic, seeking people work with them. I would include Lt Col V. Utev, majors V. Vabishevich and O. Butakov, and Capt A. Smelov among such people.

Many other officers can be named who use computers in official work in a methodologically correct manner. Computers have become our reliable assistants in solving problems of an accounting and statistical nature, but when it is a matter of choosing optimum solutions to tactical missions, some resort to the help of a slide rule, after the old way. Questions of exchanging programs, and "dialogs" between a computer center and small computers also leave much to be desired.

Increasing the level of electronic software depends to no small extent on specialist training. Therefore I suggest supplementing the subsection "In the area of public education" with the words: "Higher school graduates must master computer skills, and especially working with personal and embedded microprocessor devices."

6904

CSO: 1801/0068

6 February 1986

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

MILITARY TRIBUNALS MEETING--There was a training methods course for military tribunal judges devoted to the tasks of military judicial organs in light of resolutions of the April and October 1985 CPSU Central Committee plenums, precongress party documents, and demands of the USSR minister of defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on further strengthening of military discipline and law and order. Giving briefings were Lt Gen Justice S. Maksimov, chief of the Military Tribunals Directorate, and Maj Gen Justice M. Marov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court Military Cases Collegium. Special emphasis was placed on strengthening the indoctrinational role of judicial activity and on prevention of law violations. [By Col Justice N. Gavrilov] [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 85 p 6] 6904

CSO: 1801/70

GROUND FORCES

DISCUSSION OF NEW BTR-80

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 85 pp 14-15

[Article by Col A. Vasilyev and Sr Lt V. Sirenko under the rubric "For the Young Soldier about Combat Equipment": "BTR-80 Armored Personnel Carrier"]

[Text] Increasingly sophisticated models of combat equipment are coming into the Soviet Army inventory. One of them, the BTR-80 armored personnel carrier [APC] (a four-axle combat vehicle with eight-wheel drive), is capable of following tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and of crossing emplacements, trenches and water obstacles on the move. It also can handle mountain roads with talus, and passes above the clouds as well as desert sands or virgin snow.

Designers managed to implement a number of interesting solutions in the new wheeled vehicle created on the basis of the BTR-70. For example, one powerful economic diesel engine has been installed in place of two carburetor engines. Special tubeless, pressure-regulated tires have been used. Many assemblies and systems have been improved to increase their reliability and survivability. Protection for the vehicle crew and passengers has been improved. The turret mounting has higher combat characteristics.

The vehicle's all-around armor protection and hermetic seal of hull and turret, with an overpressure of purified air created within them, serve as the vehicle crew's basic protection against the effects of enemy weapons, including nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. Hull and turret armor is capable of withstanding enemy small arms and mortar and artillery fragments. Firefighting equipment and devices for preventing vehicle flooding in case the hull is damaged while afloat also are provided in the APC.

The BTR-80 is similar to its predecessor in overall configuration. The driving compartment is located in the forward part of the hull. It contains work stations for the vehicle commander and driver-mechanic. Also installed here are observation devices allowing observation and vehicle operation day and night, a test and measuring instrument panel, controls, a radio, and intercom. A slit with ball and socket support is located in the frontal armor for firing the submachinegun.

The engine compartment is in the rear part of the hull and separated from the fighting compartment by a bulkhead. It contains the engine with clutch and

gearbox, which represent a single power unit; water and oil radiators; heat exchangers; gearbox oil cooler; engine preheater; water-jet propeller; bilge pump; filter-ventilation unit; fuel tanks; generators and other equipment.

The engine is a four-stroke, liquid-cooled, turbo-supercharged 260 hp (191 kw) V-8. Use of the highly efficient diesel permitted an increase in range in comparison with the BTR-70 without an actual increase in volume of the main fuel tanks. A need for additional tanks also disappeared.

The engine's higher torque made it possible to increase the vehicle's average speed.

Designers concerned themselves with increasing the APC's combat readiness in the cold season of the year. For example, the engine can be started at an ambient air temperature of -5 to -25 degrees Centigrade without a lengthy preheater warmup using the electrical torch device [elektrofakelnoye ustroystvo]. The air is heated by a tongue of flame formed from diesel fuel combustion in the intake manifolds while the engine is being turned by the starter and during its initial operation until it begins steady operation.

A snorkel is installed when crossing water obstacles with a wave height of over 0.5 meters to prevent water from entering the engine.

The use of one engine in the BTR-80 involved a considerable change in the transmission. Mechanical force is supplied to a five-speed, three-way [trekhkhodovaya] gearbox through a dry double-plate clutch with hydraulic drive. Second, third, fourth and fifth gears are provided with synchronizers.

Torque is supplied from the gearbox through an intermediate cardan shaft to a two-stage transfer case with a differential distribution of torque into two flows: to the first and third, and to the second and fourth axles. There is positive locking of the interaxle differential for bad road conditions. The blocking devices provide for engaging a step-down gear and blocking the interaxle differential only with front axles engaged. The transfer case has a clutch--a maximum-moment clutch--to preclude a break when transmission elements are overloaded (with differential locked).



Power for the water-jet propeller and winch also is taken off the transfer case. Two brake mechanisms of the transmission-type parking brake system are mounted on the case.

The original design of the transfer case allows the use in the BTR-80 of many assemblies and parts of its predecessor with slight changes; this includes driving axles, suspension, steering, service brakes and so on.

The powerful engine, up-to-date transmission, wheeled drive [kolesnyy dvizhitel] and soft suspension give the vehicle good trafficability during movement over rugged terrain. The APC's highway speed reaches 80-85 km/hr.

The fighting compartment is in the turret and middle part of the hull. The vehicle's organic weapons are a 14.5-mm heavy-caliber KPVT [Vladimirov tank

БТР-80
1 - trim vane (splash panel); 2 - commander's observation hatch cover; 3 - driver's observation hatch cover; 4 - searchlight; 5 - driver's hatch cover; 6 - smoke grenades; 7 - upper escape hatch; 8 - spare parts and accessories container; 9 - lower door for side escape hatch; 10 - upper door for side escape hatch; 11 - firing ports; 12 - winch cable.



POWER TRAIN SCHEMATIC FOR BTR-80
1 - winch reduction gear; 2 - wheel reduction gear; 3 - drive shaft for wheel reduction gear; 4 - axle drive shafts; 5 - intermediate drive shaft; 6 - transmission housing; 7 - drive shaft for water propeller motor; 8 - linkage (coupler); 9 - motor; 10 - water propeller; 11 - water propeller shaft; 12 - 4th axle (rear axle); 13 - 3rd axle; 14 - transfer case; 15 - 2nd axle; 16 - 1st axle (front); 17 - front and rear winch drive shafts.

machinegun] and a coaxial 7.62-mm PKT [Kalashnikov tank machinegun]. The turret mounting also contains a day sight, two observation devices, and manual drives for the laying mechanisms in horizontal and vertical planes, which allow rapid, accurate laying of the weapon on various targets.

The gun range of fire against ground targets with the KPVT machinegun reaches 2000 meters, and it is 1500 meters with the PKT. The KPVT can be used to fire on slow, low-flying targets at ranges up to 1000 meters, with the maximum angle of elevation being 60 degrees. The KPVT's rate of fire is 500-600 rounds per minute and the PKT's is 700-800 rounds per minute. The unit of fire is 500 and 2000 rounds respectively in belts stowed in ammunition boxes.

The turret is fitted with six smoke grenade launchers.

The fighting compartment has slits with ball and socket supports for machinegun and submachinegun fire. Here too are two single seats along the sides of the hull and two three-place seats over the transfer case. There are places in the compartment for the KPVT And PKT machinegun units of fire, ZUR [surface to air guided missile] stowage, eight submachineguns, unit of fire of the mounted personnel's machineguns, handheld antitank rocket launcher and its rounds, F-1 hand grenades, a flare pistol with signal flares, intercom sets, observation devices and other gear.

Three slits on the vehicle's left side and three on the right permit a mounted force sitting in the multiplace seats to fire four submachineguns and two machineguns from the move and from short halts. One more slit on the hull's right front sloping plate serves for submachinegun fire by a mounted person sitting in the single seat behind the vehicle commander. Motorized riflemen in the APC can bring down literally a hail of lead on the enemy.

The APC can be exited through two double side hatches and two upper hatches. The upper hatches of the fighting compartment have smaller hatches for firing submachineguns against high targets.

Use of the BTR-80 with high combat and technical characteristics substantially improves the tactical capabilities of our Army's motorized rifle subunits.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1985

6904

CSO: 1801/67

CIVIL DEFENSE

YENISEYSK AUTO ENTERPRISE DRAWS CRITICISM FROM RSFSR CD

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85, p 17

[Article: "On a Signal from Yeniseysk"]

[Text] The editors received an alarming letter from Yeniseysk, Krasnoyarsk Kray. Its author, A. Runov, is the senior civil defense engineer of the Yeniseysk auto enterprise and reported the underestimation of civil defense [CD] measures on the part of leaders of this installation as well as of several other of the city's installations. We sent the letter to the headquarters of the RSFSR civil defense. And here is the reply which arrived from the chief of staff and deputy chief of civil defense of the RSFSR, Colonel General D. Krutskikh:

"In connection with the letter of the senior CD engineer of the Yeniseysk auto enterprise, I report the following.

"A committee of the civil defense staff of Krasnoyarsk Kray together with representatives of the kray services conducted a special-purpose check of the CD condition at Yeniseysk installations. The facts presented in the letter as regards the Yeniseysk auto enterprise as well as other installations were confirmed.

"The results of the committee's work became the subject of a critique which was conducted with leaders of the city's enterprises. The critique was attended by the first secretary of the CPSU gorkom and the chairmen of city rayon ispolkoms. Specific measures directed toward the improvement of the CD condition were outlined.

"The leader of the Yeniseysk auto enterprise, Comrade V. A. Sanko, was called to party accountability for a superficial approach to the solution of CD problems. He was reprimanded without an entry in his registration form. He was also punished administratively (by the ispolkom of the city soviet).

"The lack of control and the fact that timely effective measures were not adopted on letters (complaints) from subordinate enterprises concerning CD problems were pointed out to the leadership of the Krasnoyarskavtotrans' association.

"The CD staff of the kray together with representatives of the association are planning to conduct a repeat check of the Yeniseysk auto enterprise to determine how the state of civil defense is improving there."

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1985

6367

CSO: 1801/57

CIVIL DEFENSE

DESCRIPTION OF RURAL EXERCISE

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 pp 14-15

[Article by I. Podiyenkov, master of production instruction of civil defense courses, Novograd-Volynskiy, Zhitomir Oblast: "In Close Contact"]

[Text] Some time ago, a combined exercise was conducted in the Stribezhskiy rural Soviet of Chervonoarmeyskiy rayon. Participating in it were kolkhoz workers ("Pobeda" kolkhoz), pupils and teachers of the secondary school, and personnel of the medical aid station, a communication section, and trade enterprises. A headquarters was formed beforehand on the decision of the Soviet's ispolkom, a commission was created for the case of reception of evacuated population, and groups were formed for instruction of the non-working population.

Early in the morning, the duty officer for the rural Soviet received from the rayispolkom the training signal concerning the emergence of a threat of attack. This was immediately reported to the chairman of the ispolkom, S. Zakharevich, who ordered the supervisory personnel to assemble immediately. Soon the chairman of the "Pobeda" kolkhoz, Ya. Romanchuk, the principal of the school, G. Andriyevskiy, the chief of the aid station, N. Netreba, and the store head, V. Kravchuk, arrived at the rural Soviet. The staff, headed by the secretary of the rural Soviet, T. Bakulyuk, assembled.

In connection with the situation which had been created, the chairman of the rural Soviet issued an order to conduct protective measures and to begin the accomplishment of work on increasing the stability of the facilities' agricultural production. The following type of work was begun in the brigades, on the farms, and in the institutions. Stock-raising premises were hermetically sealed as were storehouses. Supplies of feed for several days were brought up to the farms. Sheds with current were built.

In the "Pobeda" kolkhoz, all formations took cover in the allotted places on the signal "Air Alarm." It turned out that there is a silo trench on the farm which has been released and which can be adapted to provide cover for the animals.

A spacious cellar which once was a storehouse for spare parts was used as the control post of the kolkhoz and the rural Soviet.

A special situation soon arrived: a simulated stricken area, destruction, and obstruction had been formed in the area of the lumber yard and vehicle pool, fires are observed, and there are casualties. A composite group under command of

kolkhoz brigade leader N. Zherebchuk was sent to the stricken area. The rescuers looked for casualties, removed (carried) them from the area, and dismantled the obstructions. The firemen extinguished the fires using special machines and fire extinguishers.

Bulldozer operator V. Strelchenko and excavator operator P. Moroz cleared away the obstructions and approaches confidently and quickly. They both are Komsomols and recently returned from the army. Right there in the stricken area the members of the voluntary aid detachment rendered first aid in a qualified manner to all casualties and then sent them to the aid station.

The situation became more complicated in the course of the rescue work. The signal "Radiation Danger" arrived from the radiation and chemical observation post. Now all participants in the exercise continued to accomplish their assigned tasks in protective equipment.

The livestock raisers and field-crop growers had many concerns on this exercise. Putting bags on the heads of the animals, they led them from the stricken area. The plant protection team headed by agronomist S. Prokopchuk hermetically sealed the grain storehouse, covered the seed stock and fodder with a film and tarpaulin, and prepared equipment for the processing of contaminated sowings.

The personnel of the aid station, communication section, and store hermetically sealed their premises, made very simple devices to protect the respiratory organs, and ensured blackout of the buildings. The aid station was reinforced by members of the voluntary aid detachment of the secondary school and there it became possible to perform preventive inoculations.

It should be said that the staffs of the rural Soviet and the kolkhoz worked in close contact, being at the protected control post. They established protective regimes to prevent the overirradiation of people and animals. They also made estimates of deficient PRU [antiradiation cover] for subordinate institutions and in this it was considered that evacuated population may arrive and the volume of work in case of the deployment of a rural aid station was defined more accurately.

Unfortunately, an error crept in during the estimate of the radiation situation. On the day that the exercise was conducted a strong, gusty wind blew and its velocity reached about 20 meters per second; this is approximately 72 kilometers per hour. The staff of the rural Soviet did not consider this and made its estimate formally. But you see, with such a strong wind the radioactive cloud will be dispersed over large areas, in connection with which the level of terrain contamination will be lower. It is one thing on paper, but another thing under real conditions. This was discussed at the critique.

It should be noted that the deputies of the rural Soviet took an active part in the preparation of the exercise--they made the rounds of the kolkhoz farmers' homes and told them how to adapt residential houses, cellars, and underground works for antiradiation cover, how to hermetically seal dug wells and prepare auxiliary premises for protection, and where to keep cows, pigs, and fowl for personal use. They explained how to protect children, produce, and fodder and how to act on warning signals.

The evaluation of the exercise was good, but this by no means signifies that there were no shortcomings. For example, at times the commanders of teams and squads of some formations acted unconfidently and their commands were not heard. For some reason, on the signal "Radiation Danger" the majority of the formations donned gas masks although it is very difficult to work in gas masks and the productivity of labor is reduced. It is believed that a better variation when working under such conditions should be considered to be the use of respirators, cotton overalls, and rubber boots.

After the exercise, all its participants saw motion pictures on civil defense in the House of Culture.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1985

6367

CSO: 1801/57

6 February 1986

REAR SERVICES/DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

REVIEW: CIVIL AIR FLEET IN WWII

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 85 p 2

[Review by Col (Res) A. Vitkovskiy, Hero of Socialist Labor, Honored Pilot of USSR, of book "Grazhdanskiy vozdushnyy flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne [The Civil Air Fleet in the Great Patriotic War] by a group of authors under general editorship of B. P. Bugayev, Izdatelstvo "Vozdushnyy transport," 1985, 240 pages: "In the Frontline Sky"]

[Text] The stormy forties... These are never-to-be-forgotten years for us who went through the crucible of the Great Patriotic War, as they are for all the Soviet people. The memory of them lies both in the grief of those who defended the homeland's honor and independence at the cost of their lives, and in gratitude toward those who were able to take the struggle against the fascist plague to a victorious conclusion at the cost of unbelievable efforts.

We Civil Air Fleet pilots had been included in special GVF [Civil Air Fleet] air groups by order of the People's Commissariat of Defense as early as June 1941 and were regarded as having been called into the Red Army. I again recalled this and much more on reading the book "Grazhdanskiy vozdushnyy flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne." In my view the group of authors succeeded in depicting the actions of Civil Air Fleet personnel in the turmoil of war years comprehensively and fully. Articles in this book, essays, memoirs and documents permit tracing the GVF's campaign record from the first day of the fascist invasion up to the bright day of victory.

The book's lead article, entitled "In Common Formation of the Motherland's Defenders," written by USSR Minister of Civil Aviation Ch Mar Avn B. Bugayev, discusses frontlinesmen with special warmth. One reads these lines and sees himself and comrades in the stormy war sky as if with his own eyes.

The heroic defense of Moscow. By direction of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command, 30 crews of the GVF Moscow Special Purpose Air Group moved units of the 5th Airborne Corps to the vicinity of Orel and Mtsensk in just three days instead of the allocated four. Or take the following episode. Col Gen A. Yeremenko, the wounded CIC of the Bryansk Front, was encircled near the Navlya Railroad Station. GVF pilot P. Kashuba transported the CIC out of encirclement in an S-2 ambulance plane on the night of 12/13 October in a heavy rain which limited visibility. Or take another example. Twelve U-2

aircraft of the Western Air Group delivered a strike against the German-occupied railroad station of Dorokhovo on the night of 4/5 November. Even the furious fire of the fascist AA guns didn't force a single one of the aircraft to turn off the bombing run. The bombs hit the target. Of the GVF pilots, G. Taran, I. Ryshkov and V. Shipilov distinguished themselves especially in the Battle of Moscow and subsequently received the high HSU title.

And the assistance to blockaded Leningrad... GVF aviators had to deliver flour, butter, and sugar to the besieged city. The pilots often remained hungry, having given their rations to children. They would carry out wounded on the return trip.

Everything happened: the bitterness of failures and the joy of victories. The article by B. Bugayev and the memoirs and essays by V. Degtev, G. Muravyev, N. Savin and others tell in detail about the GVF aviators' contribution to the Soviet soldiers' victory at Stalingrad, at Kursk, and in the final phase of the Great Patriotic War, and about assistance to Soviet partisans. For example, by the end of 1942 the GVF 1st Separate Air Regiment alone was maintaining contact with 38 partisan detachments. Direct radio communications was set up between them.

The party and state's high esteem of work by GVF personnel attests to the fact that those personnel made no small contribution to the victory. One air transport division, four separate air regiments and one separate air squadron were redesignated as guards, twelve units received honorary designations, and two divisions and seven regiments received combat orders for the successful performance of combat assignments and for the courage, bravery and proficiency displayed in the war years.

I am sure that this book will be read with interest not only by representatives of the famed galaxy of civil aviation and by frontlinesmen, but also by people of the middle generation, as we say, by the youth, and by servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces.

6904

CSO: 1801/70

DOSA AF

ON NEED TO IMPROVE LEADERSHIP CADRES

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 85 pp 4-5

[Article by V. Sysoyev: "The Main Link"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee put forth for the party and for the entire Soviet people a task of tremendous historical importance: to achieve a decisive turn toward the transfer of the economy to the path of the intensification and acceleration of Soviet society's social and economic development. For the accomplishment of this task the CPSU Central Committee considers it necessary to accomplish a number of economic, scientific and technical, and organizational measures, comprehensively strengthen state, labor, and planning discipline, and improve work with cadres everywhere.

Cadres of party, state, and public organizations and of all branches of the national economy, science and culture, and the Armed Forces always were, are, and will be that main link by means of which the entire chain of urgent problems connected with the forward advancement of our socialist society is pulled. Therefore, the Central Committee of the Leninist party unremittingly keeps the personnel policy problems in its field of view. It constantly rivets the attention of party, state, and administrative organs to it. And so now, when life is forcing us to raise the development of productive forces and the national well-being to a qualitatively new stage, the CPSU Central Committee again points out the necessity for the serious improvement of work with cadres.

This requirement pertains to an equal degree to all sectors and directions of our state's life. It also has a direct relationship, of course, to the organizations of the Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

In carrying out the decisions of party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the requirements of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 7 May 1966, "On the Status of Measures for Improving the Work of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF USSR)," the DOSAAF committees under the leadership of party organs achieved a certain improvement in personnel work. In many of the society's collectives candidates intended for election or assignment to leadership posts are selected more carefully, concern for the appointment of leading specialists was intensified, and favorable shifts have been noted in the staffing of the apparatus of local committees. The party stratum has increased among the society's personnel and there have been more people with a higher education.

In a number of places demandingness toward cadres was increased in questions of their performance of their official duties as well as for personal behavior. More attention is being devoted to the training of the personnel, raising their professional qualifications, and increasing their political knowledge.

But life does not stand still. The tasks which have increased under conditions of aggravation of the international situation in preparing the youth for military service, the equipping of the schools and clubs of the defense society with complex contemporary equipment, the higher level of the people's education and culture, and the line for a reduction in the staff of organizational personnel in the voluntary societies impose increased requirements on the DOSAAF cadres and their professional and ideological-moral aspect.

The necessity for improvement in this work is also caused by serious flaws and omissions in it. In a number of places the Lenin principles for work with cadres are being grossly violated; frequently they are reduced only to the replacement of some employees by others, and at times, not the best. Questions of training and indoctrination remain in the background. And therefore, some sectors are in the hands of weak leaders for a long time.

The interests of the matter require the leaders and party organizations of DOSAAF committees, schools, clubs, and enterprises to raise personnel work to a higher level and ensure the strict observance of Lenin principles of personnel policy and the steady accomplishment of party requirements in the selection, placement, and indoctrination of cadres.

It should be persistently seen that all sectors of mass defense work are headed by politically mature, competent leaders who possess lofty moral qualities, enjoy authority among the DOSAAF members, and are capable of successfully implementing party policy and organizing work on implementation of the decisions of congresses and the decrees of the leading organs of the defense society. For this, it is required, first of all, to improve the matter of cadre selection and to see that it is accomplished according to plan and systematically. With the promotion of an employee the leaders of collectives must ascertain the opinion of him which is held by the primary party organization and the broad public. It is rash here to rely on questionnaire data alone.

It can be said that we now have unlimited opportunities for the selection of excellent employees for any sectors. Servicemen in the reserve were, are, and will be the main source for the replenishment of the defense society's cadres. They possess qualities which are extremely needed for DOSAAF cadres. They have behind them army service, the necessary military training, and the skills of working with people.

The Komsomol activists have shown themselves to be a reliable reserve. Former Komsomol employees are working fruitfully at leadership posts of the most diverse scale. In Gorkiy Oblast, for example, 40 percent of the chairmen of DOSAAF rayon and city committees are employees up to 30 years of age, and one out of every three of them came from Komsomol work. S. Balakin, former department head of an oblast Komsomol committee, is coping reliably with the duties of deputy chairman of a DOSAAF obkom. Mass defense work was noticeably revived in the Buturlinskiy and Bolshemurashkinskiy rayons of Gorkiy Oblast after DOSAAF committees here were headed by Komsomols Ogurtsov and Kalekin who recently arrived from

active military service. Unfortunately, in many DOSAAF organizations questions of attracting the youth to work in the defense society are approached cautiously. Even more timidity and even some bias are displayed with the promotion of women to leadership posts.

However, the practice of many years shows convincingly that the judicious combination of experienced cadres with talented youth accompanies success without fail. In general, it is believed, when staffing the leading organs it should be seen that their composition to a certain extent corresponds to the nature of the composition of one or another specific organization for age, sex, social status, education, nationality, and so forth.

To avoid errors in the selection of cadres, a trial period and probationary work envisioned by Soviet legislation are used in a number of organizations. In some places, for example, before recommending a person for election to the post of chairman of the raykom, he is appointed to the post of instructor. This permits the leadership and activists to look the candidate over closely and to see his strong and weak aspects, and the candidate himself--to get to know the nature of DOSAAF work.

The replacement of cadres proceeds most smoothly and continuity in work is preserved more strongly in those organizations which have a reliable and effective reserve. But this seemingly simple truth is frequently buried in oblivion. There still are many leaders who are not concerned about training, from among their closest assistants, personnel who could replace them and conduct matters skillfully. Because of this, difficult situations often arise, for example, upon the departure of chairmen of DOSAAF committees and chiefs of training and sports organizations. Although, as is known, these officials each have several deputies.

For the good of the matter, there should be a decisive change in the attitude toward the staffing of the deputy element. The deputy is called the deputy because, in his training and work experience, he should be fully capable of replacing his chief in case of necessity.

As a rule, high indices in work are achieved with a certain stability of cadres. Implementation of a number of specific measures permitted reducing the fluctuation in authorized personnel in recent years, especially among chairmen of rayon and city committees, the leader and teacher personnel of schools, and personnel of the staff of oblast, kray, and republic DOSAAF committees. However, the frequent changeability of personnel in many of the society's organizations continues to remain a serious problem. The steadfastness of this disease is aggravated by insufficiently effective doctoring.

Many leaders see only one method for healing--an increase in wages. But their increase is not a daily phenomenon and, moreover, is not a panacea. The size of the wage in all DOSAAF organizations is the same for the same categories of personnel. In recent years it has been often increased. This year the next wage increase took place for chairmen of DOSAAF committees of all ranks, their deputies, teachers, masters of production instruction, leaders, and other teaching personnel of the defense society's training organizations. At the same time, the fluctuation in cadres is not being reduced everywhere.

Their retention is noticeably furthered by such measures as the constant improvement in working conditions, the good arrangement of work sites and comfortable living conditions, and the organization of feeding and rest. Important and, perhaps, decisive significance is had by the collective's creation of an harmonious, healthy labor attitude where a spirit of comradeship, cleanliness, and openness of relations prevails and there is no place for slackers and bribe-takers and for those who like to enrich themselves at the expense of others, and a benevolent attitude toward cadres is inseparably combined with high demandingness and devotion to principle. Not one intelligent worker will leave a good, harmonious collective and people stick to it firmly for years.

A hardworking collective was formed in the Moscow Naval School. The leadership and party and trade union organizations of the school are working persistently on its solidarity. The DOSAAF city committee is exerting an influence on this. An exchange of working experience has been broadly organized in the schools, the expanse has been opened up for creativity, and labor discipline is maintained at a high level. Veterans render comprehensive support to newly arrived personnel. Almost all associates actively participate in the school's social life. People have been working here for 10 years or more; employees do not leave even when they move to a new place of residence and it proves necessary to spend much time on the road. Nor do those who have retired on a pension break their ties with the collective. The communists step forth as genuine fighters for organization and order, for the clear performance of official duties, and for high quality in the training of students.

Work directed toward raising professional knowledge and the practical qualifications of the cadres needs further improvement. Some leaders of DOSAAF committees, schools, clubs, and enterprises still underestimate the significance of professional training and are not concerned about raising the qualifications of subordinates or the development of their practical qualities. The especially erroneous opinion is also present among individual workers of the society that there is no need and it is useless for them to study. "At one time," they reason, "we commanded regiments," they say, "and we occupied higher posts, and here we have some school or DOSAAF committee. Old knowledge is more than enough for this." But, as is known, the old store of knowledge is good if it is constantly renewed. Until recently, instances have occurred where some committees do not accomplish orders concerning sending associates to courses or they send personnel who, after training, are immediately released from the posts being occupied and leave the DOSAAF system.

Instructive seminars, training assemblies, briefings, and conferences are still not conducted everywhere in a businesslike manner and do not always take place. They frequently bear the imprint of formalism and scholasticism.

The local instruction of cadres is poorly organized. Many supervisory personnel rarely visit subordinate organizations, do not find the time for meetings with lower-level activists, students, sportsmen, and regular DOSAAF members, and do not delve deeply into the life and activity of the collectives.

Such an effective means as checking execution is poorly used for the practical instruction of cadres. The checking still does not have a sufficiently systematic nature and depth. In many cases, it is limited to recording shortcomings impassively, and practical measures to correct the state of affairs are absent.

Acquaintance with defense collectives convinces us that many problems, omissions, and failures in work arise most often due to the insufficient competence of individual officials. Therefore, the struggle for better indices and for bringing about organization and order urgently demands the serious correction of the matter of training and retraining cadres.

In improving the organization of training, we should intensify attention to the content of the lessons. It is believed that it would be expedient, in particular, to allot more time to the study of Soviet legislation and DOSAAF guidance documents as applicable to the functional duties of the trainees and the work practice with people and to organize and maintain businesslike contacts with the appropriate state and public organizations so the DOSAAF cadres have a deeper understanding of the nature and special features of the defense society's activity and they could perform their official duties in a qualified manner.

Special attention is merited by questions connected with the moral make-up of the cadres. Disgraceful instances of padding, embezzlement, and other instances of official abuse continue to occur in some of the society's organizations. The custom of organizing banquets and abundant feeding with the drinking of liquor on the occasion of the next graduation of students, completion of checks, or the conclusion of sports contests proves to be extremely tenacious. Considerable state and social resources are squandered on this. Noticing traces of this illegal matter, officials assigned to keep order commit a new crime: they falsify accounting documents.

Nor can one fail to be concerned by the circumstance that a significant portion of the society's cadres put up with the fact that in many schools the training of specialists for the Armed Forces is conducted with separation of the predraftee city-dweller from production, clubs and sports structures are closed on their days off, in a number of places study-group work is closed down, sports contests are organized during working time, many primary organizations do not conduct any practical work, and so forth.

The party points out that the confidence in cadres which we have consolidated should be inseparably combined with basic demandingness and high exactingness. It is necessary that all personnel, including leaders, constantly be under control both from above and from below and are aware of their accountability and responsibility not only to those whom they lead, but also to those who lead them and with whom they work hand in hand so as not to permit liberalism and condescension in relation to incorrect action and so that no one avoids deserved punishment. People should see how consistently and uncompromisingly the struggle is waged to ensure order, discipline, and organization.

The demand on leaders, of course, is special. They are required to be the model in everything. It is their direct duty to have a profound understanding of party policy and to be able to carry it out, transmit their ideological conviction to subordinates, and serve as an example of the unity of word and deed. And it is very poor when individual leaders such as, for example, the former chairman of the Bashkir Oblast DOSAAF committee, Minigulov, the chief of the Novosibirsk aero club, Larin, and several others did not justify the confidence placed in them and violated Soviet laws and standards of communist ethics. Each such case inflicts colossal harm on the cause of indoctrinating people, has a corrupting effect on all collectives, and has a negative effect on the accomplishment of planned tasks.

Now as never before, the leaders are required not only to be ideally pure in everything, but also to increase their activity in the struggle against all antipodes of the socialist way of life and against nepotism, a narrow-minded approach toward the performance of official duties, drunkenness, and indiscipline.

An important means for instilling a sense of responsibility in cadres is correctly organized disciplinary practice. Unfortunately, it still is often distorted. Many cases are noted where punishments are dispensed, as they say, in anger, without grounds, and not in the interests of indoctrinating personnel, but only to show: here, they say, we are such demanding people, how effectively we react. There is also another extreme: individual personnel are generously showered with rewards undeservedly. Cases are encountered where employees who have punishments are awarded bonuses, where bonuses are paid out with their subsequent collection for banquets and parties, and where favor is gained with "needed" people.

An improvement in cadre work is unthinkable without the constant improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work, without increasing the social-political activity and consciousness of all associates of the society, and without intensification of the work of party organizations of committees, schools, clubs, and enterprises of DOSAAF and their influence on this most important sector.

To meet the party's requirements with deeds, it is necessary to improve work on molding in the cadres of the defense society a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and a sense of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. Special importance is acquired under contemporary conditions by the strengthening of the ideological steadfastness of cadres and the ability to withstand any forms of foreign influence, capitalist propaganda, and its attempts to slander socialism and slow down our forward movement.

DOSAAF committees and leaders of schools, clubs, and enterprises should persistently develop in personnel of the society a sense of the practicable and the ability to evaluate the results of their labor self-critically, direct the knowledge acquired to the benefit of daily practical work, and perform their everyday duties in an inspired manner and creatively. A certain portion of the comrades should be helped to get rid of sluggishness and complacency and any manifestations of showiness and irresponsibility.

The next election campaign is ahead. Of course, it should be used for a profound collective analysis of the state of personnel work and for strengthening the committees and inspection commissions of the society with energetic leaders who have initiative.

Further improvement of work with the cadres of DOSAAF organizations is the true guarantee that our defense society will increase its contribution to the cause of strengthening the country's defensive capability and will greet the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in a worthy manner.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyye znaniya", 1985

6367

CSO: 1801/57

6 February 1986

MILITARY HISTORY

REVIEW: ZHILIN ON WAR, MILITARY HISTORY

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 85 p 3

[Review by Val. Goltsev of book "O voyne i voyennoy istorii" [War and Military History] by P. A. Zhilin, Nauka, Moscow, 1984, 543 pages, under rubric "Books": "Indoctrination by History"]

[Text] The monograph entitled "O voyne i voyennoy istorii" belongs to the pen of well-known historian P. A. Zhilin, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member, Lenin and State prize laureate.

Being an important component of historical science, military history focusses its principal attention on identifying the causality, political character and consequences of warfare. It studies war as a complex social phenomenon, reveals methods of conducting combat actions, and analyzes the degree of development of strategy and of the military art as a whole.

The first section of the book is devoted to the classical heritage of Marx, Engels and Lenin and to their theoretical works on military matters. In the book they comprise that firm ideological foundation which the author relies upon in examining the chief events of World War II and various aspects of the military art. All this is done in close interrelationship with the political needs of modern times and with the threat of nuclear conflict.

The reader also will find much of interest in chapters of the book which analyze the military experience of the proletarian revolution and typical features of Soviet strategy in the Civil War, developed under Lenin's immediate leadership. The author's opinions about our victory at the Khalkhin-Gol River and about its influence on development of the Soviet military art are curious and original.

The work's core is a critique and scientific analysis of Great Patriotic War events. Here, relying on vast factual material, the author thoroughly traces how Hitler's aggression was prepared against our Motherland. The policy of violent anticommunism carried on by governments of that time in Great Britain and France approved the Hitlerites and urged them to the East. What is noteworthy is that the war being prepared was cloaked by Goebbels' false propaganda about the "red threat" to Europe and about the "defense of democracy" against communism.

In reviewing Great Patriotic War events, the author focusses his attention on its key stages: on the battles of Moscow, Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge, which led to the military defeat of Nazi Germany. Victory in these battles was a result of the courage and valor of Soviet soldiers and of the superiority of Soviet weapons and the Soviet military art. The German defeat was predetermined by the great advantages of socialism and of our state and social system.

Lenin's great party was the organizer of all our victories in the Great Patriotic War. Many pages of the study are devoted to its work, and in them the Communist Party appears as a fighting party, a party of selfless heroes, and a wise and authoritative leader of the people.

The book conducts a many-sided study of World War II and a scientific analysis of its course and formation of the anti-Hitler coalition with strict scientific objectivity. The author was able to pull in numerous primary sources to substantiate his theoretical conclusions. They include excerpts from correspondence of the heads of government of the belligerent states, Supreme High Command directives, diplomatic dispatches, plans and operational studies of the opposing sides' staffs, and the diaries and memoirs of war figures. Among the latter, materials from the personal archives of Field Marshal Paulus are curious. The book's author is the discoverer of these interesting memoirs.

Today the reasons for the outbreak of World War II and especially of the Great Patriotic War, and their outcome, consequences and lessons are the subject of a fierce ideological struggle. Various West European and American falsifiers are trying to shift responsibility to the Soviet Union for unleashing the war, to distort the reasons for our victory, to blacken the Soviet Army's liberation mission in Europe and, in the final account, to justify Hitler and German fascism. The book "O voyne i voyennoy istorii" provides a worthy rebuff to the hostile fabrications of imperialist propaganda. Fully armed with scientific knowledge, the author comprehensively proves their historical insolvency.

It should be noted that the author elaborates the pressing problems of the methodology of military-historical studies and military historiography with genuine boldness, and this is a new, major step in developing important areas of scientific knowledge.

6904

CSO: 1801/0068

AFGHANISTAN

NARRATIVE OF FIGHTING ON QONDUZ-MAZAR-E SHARIF ROUTE

PM191500 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Dec 85 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Lazarev under the rubric "A Komsomol Character": "Happiness is..."

[Excerpt] Red Banner Carpathian Military District--There can be no worthwhile Komsomol work if the secretary does not enjoy high prestige! Yuriy Belyakov learned this truth back during his service in the renowned I.V. Panfilov Guards Division. And he was able to see for himself its correctness in his new posting, in Afghanistan; 28 months was more than enough time to see it...

"The regulations do not specify the Komsomol secretary's place in the battalion's battle order," Major A. Tsarev, the battalion commander, said drily during their first conversation. "According to the situation, you will decide it yourself. Or with the help of my deputy for political affairs. For the time being, fix yourself up."

After much soul-searching he did so. He himself wrote the application asking to be sent to the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan to continue his service. Although the application was accepted, it was almost as if he had done something wrong. However, such thoughts were dispelled when he got to know the people. Two Orders of the Red Star gleamed on the chest of Sergeant Penzhamin Baybasunov. The military labor of Sergeant Vladimir Dnistriyan and Privates Anatoliy Danoy and Arkadiy Butakov had been rewarded with state awards. They had earned the right to lead the Komsomol collective. And earned it not by fine words but by actions.

But how would Ensign Belyakov behave in battle rather than at meetings? Probably no one knew the answer to this question at that time. Not even Yuriy.

For understandable reasons, special care is taken of greenhorns in Afghanistan. They need time to acquire the necessary skills, know-how, and experience of combat operations. Sergeants Dnistriyan and Baybasunov and the servicemen who had spent their first year in Afghanistan and had been tempered in the heat of the clashes with the dushmans had the edge as regards this experience. And so it was primarily they who were assigned to protect villages and convoys from the dushmans.

At the shooting range and on the exercise ground Belyakov did not spare himself. In scorching heat, shoulder to shoulder with other servicemen, he carried out outflanking and encircling maneuvers, practiced shooting, and learned to instantly find natural cover or rapidly create artificial cover. No allowances were made, no corners were cut, because what ultimately sums up your performance here is not so much what is written in your record book but how you acquit yourself in battle. And your life and the lives of your comrades depend on this, because without the necessary skill and know-how you cannot come to their rescue, you cannot give them fire support right when they need it.

Sooner than many other greenhorns, Ensign Belyakov was assigned to the escort detail of a convoy.

The Qonduz-Mazar-e Sharif route is considered one of the difficult ones. And not just because of the steepness of the twisting mountain roads. There are just too many places suitable for setting up ambushes or mining the roadway. However, on this occasion the convoy proceeded without any holdups. It was very close to its final destination. It only had to cross a bridge. But it was immediately beyond the bridge that it all happened...

A gasoline tanker blew up. Jets of burning fuel shot skyward and then subsided and spread over the road like a river of fire. From behind a hut another grenade launcher opened fire. Another truck flared up like a torch.

The dushmans' plans was to split up the convoy, to bar its way with the burning trucks and then to strike home. The situation demanded decisive action. Barking a brief "Follow me!" Belyakov rushed toward the hut. Bullets whistled past his head. He threw a grenade. The frenzied chatter of the submachineguns broke off. The grenade launches fell silent too. With the help of our servicemen, the Afghan drivers pulled the burning trucks off the road.

"Smart action!" the commander of the escort detail said approvingly of Belyakov's exploit, wiping the sweat off his heat-flushed face. "However, the dushmans will not rest content with this. I am sure they will try to blow up the bridge. Take two armored personnel carriers. You must hold out till morning..."

Skillfully, they chose hideouts for the vehicles and strengthened the shelters with heavy boulders. Belyakov worked out the arcs of fire. A black southern night followed, crisscrossed with machinegun fire. Hollow-charge grenades exploded all around with a blinding glare. Lead from large-caliber machineguns thudded against the armor. Our servicemen returned the fire, they held their positions, and prevented the bandits from reaching the bridge.

Later there were even more difficult situations. In the winter Belyakov and his comrades were exposed to fire on bare rocks for days on end. Twice at critical moments Belyakov took over the command of the platoon... Nonetheless, that first skirmish with the bandits, that first night by the bridge, became engraved in his memory down to the smallest detail. And not just because shortly afterwards he received the medal "For Bravery." During the minutes of deadly danger he earned something very precious, something very important for a Komsomol secretary--the recognition and respect of his fellow servicemen.

Time went by. During the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries he, a holder of the Order of the Red Star and the medal "For Valor," proudly told his former battalion commander, Hero of the Soviet Union Captain N. Akramov, about the courage of his comrades in arms and the firm bonds which united them, as befitted frontline service...

But can he speak on their behalf now, in another battalion, with different people? He can! Platoon Deputy Commander Senior Sergeant Aleksandr Potapov, Company Komsomol Bureau Secretary Sergeant Nikolay Zhivanov, and other servicemen resemble them very much. They are equally devoted, courageous, reliable, and independent.

But there are other people in the tank battalion too. For instance, Sergeant Miller. An indifferent man who instills inertia also in his subordinates. You are not likely to get through to him with exhortations. He will again reply evasively that there is no war now, that the enemy is nominal. If it comes to a real battle, we will prove ourselves.

A dangerous delusion. Without discipline of the highest order, without skill, you are nothing in the encounter with the enemy. Belyakov saw that for himself over there in Afghanistan. And that means that you must be very exacting toward people. And you also have to ask yourself from time to time: How do I drive the tank? How am I mastering its equipment? Am I capable of replacing one specialist or another in combat? To retrain motorized riflemen as tankmen is not easy but you, as secretary, must overcome the "can't be done" and become the very best. Otherwise you will not convince Private Kondratyuk that the difficulties of service are superable, you will not inspire the young people to successfully implement the tasks set by the commander. Just as before, Belyakov's place is in the field where companies are learning to fight, rather than at the battalion headquarters, among people, rather than paper. And this is the most correct choice for a secretary.

Senior Lieutenant I. Ravlyuk, Captain R. Rasulov, and many other servicemen who share his not always easy lot in the army spoke with warmth and pride about the Komsomol bureau secretary at the Komsomol meeting.

Only on one point did they perhaps not agree in their views of Belyakov. He has again put in an application. He is again asking the command to send him to Afghanistan.

"Yes, I put in my application," Belyakov confirmed. And thinking for a while he said: "My place is there, in the battalion's combat formation..."

/12712

CSO: 1801/81

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN ALLEGED TO PREPARE 'GENOCIDE' OF BORDER TRIBES

LD040033 Moscow TASS in English 1839 GMT 3 Dec 85

[All names as received]

[Text] Moscow December 3 TASS--TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

The Pakistani authorities are preparing a fresh act of genocide against the Pushtu tribes inhabiting the area of Khyber Path [as received] on the Afghan-Pakistani border. These tribes were ordered to lay down arms and surrender, the REUTER agency said, failing which their houses will be destroyed and lands occupied. The ultimatum, the agency says, signals an end to all talks with Pushtu leader Abdul Wali Khan, who was reported to have announced his decision not to allow the Afghan counter-revolutionaries to use the territory inhabited by the tribes for launching hostile acts against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The agency says that Khyber area has been completely sealed off by tanks and the troops of the Pakistani military regime, and that the operation for the suppression of free tribes undertaken by Islamabad is the biggest in many years. Fearing for their life, many inhabitants from among the tribes of that area have already abandoned their home parts and took to the mountains for shelter.

It must be noted that the leaders of the tribes inhabiting the area of the Afghan-Pakistani border have already long opposed the use of Pakistan's territory by the United States and the other Western countries as a base for waging undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Waziri, Afridi, Momand and other tribes are also opposing Pakistan's interference in the affairs of the neighbour country.

At the Supreme Jirgah of the border tribes, which was held in Kabul in September, many representatives of the Pushtu and Baluchi tribes, including those inhabiting the Pakistani territory, declared their determination not to allow the military regime of Islamabad to send in the future Afghan counter-revolutionary gangs to the DRA across their territory, put an end to the penetration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by caravans with arms and sabotage groups, which were trained and armed in the numerous camps on

Pakistan's territory. Yet, Pakistan's ruling circles, who pin their hopes on further and even broader American military-economic aid, are not only disregarding the explicitly expressed will of the free tribes, but are even ready to sacrifice their interests and life itself for the sake of their selfish designs, using to this end the arms received from the USA.

It is not for the first time that Islamabad has used armed force against free tribes. The encroachments of the Pakistani authorities on the internal autonomy of the Pushtus have become particularly frequent in recent months in connection with the actions of the Pushtu tribes against the brigand acts of Afghan counter-revolutionary gangs plundering the local population and frustrating the traditional Afghan-Pakistani border trade. Weapons, including tanks and artillery, have already more than once been used against the "disobedient" tribes in the course of punitive operations. Acting together with counter-revolutionary gangs, the Pakistani troops brutally suppress the Pushtus, who refuse to participate in the war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and oppose the turning of their home parts into a springboard for armed sorties against Afghanistan.

Thus Islamabad had once again decided to trample underfoot, using its army and American tanks the rights and freedoms of those who favour a peaceful political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. Thus the Pakistani authorities again demonstrate that far from wishing such a settlement, they are bent on preserving whatever the cost the source of tension in the region so as to have an excuse for further financial hand-outs and arms supplies from the USA and its allies, for building up militaristic preparations against the neighbour countries and their own people.

/12712

CSO: 1812/61

AFGHANISTAN

TASS REPORTS 'TENSE SITUATION' IN KHYBER PASS

LD141528 Moscow TASS in English 1208 GMT 14 Dec 85

[Text] Kabul December 14 TASS--A tense situation remains in the area of Khyber Pass, where the Pakistani troops are continuing their combat operations against the Pushtu tribes, which do not wish the gangs of anti-Afghan counter-revolutionary rabble sent into the DRA from Pakistan's territory to cross their lands. According to a BAKHTAR agency report, punitive troops heavily shelled villages in the areas of Kajwari, Tira and Git, inflicting casualties among peaceful civilians.

Tens of thousands Pakistani men and officers, nearly 600 tanks and personnel armoured carriers are massed in the area of the city of Jamrood. Army units have cut all transport communications and suspended the supply of food to the city.

The armed resistance of the tribes is mounting. In the area of Tangi Jabha, a detachment of Afridi tribe attacked a Pakistani army unit. In the course of fighting some 50 Pakistani servicemen were taken prisoner.

The fighting men of paramilitary units--the Malishi have declared their refusal to fire at the Pushtus. A part of them has gone over to the side of the voluntary force of the tribes. The authorities were forced to disarm the Malishi and take them out of Khyber.

The repressions of the Pakistani military against the tribes were planned in advance. According to usually well-informed sources, the BAKHTAR agency said, a plenipotentiary representative of the U.S. Administration visited Islamabad in November this year. On behalf of the U.S. Government circles he demanded that Pakistan step up the scope of anti-Afghan activity. The Washington emissary drew attention of the Islamabad rulers to the fact that the sending of arms and bandit units into Afghanistan have become difficult across the areas under the control of Afridi and Shinvari.

Mass marches and rallies of protest against the arbitrary rule of the Pakistani military have been held on these days in the Afghan provinces of Qandahar, Nangarhar, Kunar and Paktiya. The protesters demanded immediate withdrawal of the Pakistani troops from the territory inhabited by the tribes.

/12712

CSO: 1812/61

AFGHANISTAN

TASS: PAKISTAN USING DRA REBELS TO SUPPRESS PASHTUNS

LD172329 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT 17 Dec 85

[Text] Kabul December 17 TASS--According to reports coming here, the Pakistani regular troops are engaged in fierce fighting in the zone inhabited by Pashtun tribes. Pakistani troops block roads between the main populated localities of the area. Water supply has been disrupted in a number of localities. There is a power blackout. The telephone communication has been disrupted. Pakistani forces, terrorizing the population, destroy housing of the rebellious tribes and their supporters, bulldoze down their houses, particularly in the Khyber area.

The Pakistani regime is using Afghan counterrevolutionaries in the fighting against Pashtun tribes. They are blocking roads in the zone inhabited by Pashtuns and staging terroristic actions against chiefs and elders of the tribes that support the policy of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Bandit units were sent into the area of the Khyber Pass to block the road to separate tribes that are fleeing to Afghanistan to save themselves from destruction by Pakistani forces.

Pashtun tribes rose in protest against actions of the Pakistani military and anti-Afghan gangs. Pashtuns demand the normalization of Pakistani-Afghan relations, recognition of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by Islamabad. Chiefs of a number of tribes demand that an end be put to the activity of the Afghan counterrevolution, that its bases, also on the Pashtun territory, be dismantled.

The actions of the armed forces of Pakistan, and also of the anti-Afghan bandit units against Pashtun tribes mean a gross violation of human rights, of the constitutional status of the zone of the tribes, of Pashtun's traditions and customs. These actions mean a policy of state terrorism. As a result of large-scale punitive operations to destroy whole settlements, considerable part of the population has been deprived of the means of subsistence. Famine started in separate areas as a result of the blockage of populated localities. Such measures for "pacification" as they are described by the Pakistani authorities, specifically the blockage of the Khyber area with a population of some 400 thousand, are even more brutal than actions against those tribes by the colonial authorities in the past. The actions of the military regime cause indignation not only among Pashtun tribes, but also among the opposition parties, public organizations of Pakistan. It is noted here that U.S. armaments are used by the Pakistani army for punitive actions against tribes. Weapons brought into Pakistan from Egypt and some other Arab countries were also found in the area of hostilities.

/12712
CSO: 1812/61

AFGHANISTAN

PRAVDA REPORTS OF 'REBEL CRIMES'

PM131428 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Dec 85 First Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Baykov: "The Crimes of Afghan Counter-revolution"]

[Text] Kabul, 12 Dec--The morning of 8 December began in the usual way in the Afghan capital: workers and employees hurrying to their work, the hubbub of the bazaar, passengers preparing to board the Kabul-Qandahar flight. Suddenly the echo of an explosion--a powerful counterrevolutionary bomb had gone off at the airport--reverberated above the city. The result was 9 dead and 54 injured. The next day there was an explosion in the Kabul Polytechnical Institute (KPI).

A gaping hole in the wall, smashed equipment in the classrooms, the floor covered in tiny lumps of concrete and fragments of glass--that is what the laboratory block looked like when we journalists arrived at the KPI.

"The bandits had planted explosives at the main entrance, hoping to kill as many students as possible," building department Dean (Mukhammad Nayer) said. "But the timing mechanism activated the bomb some minutes before classes ended and the lobby was deserted at the time. There were 21 casualties. It is difficult as yet to assess the material damage, but I think it will run into several million afghanis...

They were the latest crimes by Afghan counterrevolution which is carrying out acts of sabotage against the democratic republic. The terrorists' targets are civilians, representatives of people's power, schools, hospitals, and even mosques. It is single-minded destruction of people's property in the economic and national culture spheres. The hands of the hardened killers are guided by experienced CIA instructors. There is abundant evidence that the CIA is directly involved in training bandits for subversive actions in the DRA.

The well-informed Washington bulletin CONGRESSIONAL Quarterly reported that Washington subversion services started financing "Rebels" and training a "Fifth column" in Afghanistan at least as early as the middle of 1979.

Recently I had a talk with former dushman (Alifuddin), son of (Islamuddin), from the village of Estalef, near Kabul, who had been taken prisoner by the

people's militia. An illiterate peasant, he had been tricked into joining the gang of a certain (Mukhammad Razeq) 3 years before. In February 1984 he went to Pakistan with the gang, where he spent 3 months learning methods of killing at a camp in the vicinity of Peshawar.

"We were trained," (Alifuddin) said, "not only by Pakistanis but also by two American instructors. They did not give their names. We addressed them as 'Mimster.' They concentrated on teaching us how to handle various types of firearms and how to make explosives to carry out sabotage on highways and in population centers. We were told that schools had to be burned down so that they were unable to inculcate the ideas of revolution..."

Fed on U.S. dollars, the dushmans are carrying out their U.S. advisers' instruction--exploding bombs in crowded places and organizing sabotage at industrial enterprises.

Is this not gross interference by Washington, in defiance of all international norms, in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, is it not a manifestation of an overt and cynical form of state terrorism?!

It is indicative that the dushmans should have committed their latest crimes at a time when the United Nations has unanimously adopted a resolution condemning terrorism in any shape or form. It is the response of Afghan counter-revolution and its transatlantic patrons' to the world community.

/12712

CSO: 1801/81

AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW TV: REBELS BOMB KABUL POLYTECHNICAL INSTITUTE

LD190126 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 18 Dec 85

[Article by correspondent A. Petrova, report on the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Here is a report by our correspondent [identified by screen caption as A. Petrova] on a new crime committed by the Afghan counterrevolution.

For the students and teachers of Kabul Polytechnical Institute, this day began as usual. This is one of the country's largest learning institutions which trains qualified cadres for the developing Afghan economy: construction workers, geologists, land improvement workers, chemists, and architects.

Literally 10 minutes ago we were shooting with our cameras in this classroom. People were sitting here; lessons were taking place. Suddenly there was an explosion of impressive force. Take a look: Everything has been destroyed here. All the students and teachers ran out onto the street. Many were wounded.

You are seeing what the terrorists have done, how the building of the institute has been destroyed, how much expensive equipment has been destroyed, how the wounded are suffering. Fortunately, no one was killed.

The enemies were calculating that fear would paralyze people and deprive them for a long time of the possibility of returning to work. But lessons began on the very next day. The counterrevolutionaries are resorting to terror and are hindering the normalization of life in the country. In Afghanistan today, every victory, even in the economy or in education or culture, costs blood and even the lives of many people. [video shows students receiving instruction, damaged classroom, girl crying while wiping bloody nose, students returning to work]

/12712

CSO: 1801/81

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

PAPER ON AFGHAN MILITARY DOCTORS--[Editorial Report]--Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 December 1985 carries on page 3 a 1,500-word Kabul-dated "Afghan Reportage" entitled "Military Doctor (Valoyat)" by own special correspondent M. Kozhukhov. The article reports the work carried out by Afghan military doctors. Major General (Valoyat) Habibi is quoted as saying "We have not yet been able to organize medical units in the Army in the field." It is reported that the main military hospital in the country--Kabul's Central Military Hospital--is working today at full stretch. At a time of heavy fighting not 1 or 2 but dozens of wounded arrive there every day. There are not enough doctors or medicines." It is also stated that "in September, when the Afghan Army was engaged in a fight to the death with large rebel gangs in Paktia Province, a team of Soviet doctors worked in a field hospital 15 kilometers from the front line." [PM] /12712

PRAVDA NOTES SURRENDER OF REBEL GROUPS--Kabul, 13 Dec--In the Afghan province of Faryab, 9 armed groups numbering 485 people in all have ceased their resistance, BAKHTAR reports. They handed over to the DRA security forces a large quantity of large-caliber machineguns, grenade throwers, submachineguns, and other firearms. As the members of the former counterrevolutionary formations stated, they decided to stop the struggle against the people's power, guided by the DRA Revolutionary Council law on an amnesty for people voluntarily laying down their arms. [TASS Report: "Resistance Ceased"] [Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Dec 85 First Edition p 4 PM] /12712

CSO: 1801/81

END